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PREFACE
As we enter the third millennium of this particular era ofhuman history, the picture is not pretty.  Untold numbers
of children die of malnutrition and preventable diseases every
day;1 millions of all ages are killed in ongoing wars, most of them
waged by states against the peoples whose lands they are occupy-
ing.2  It is estimated that within this generation alone, 250 lan-
1 According to a recent U.N. report, “We the Children:  Meeting the Promises of
the World Summit for Children,” one of every twelve children will die before age
five, almost all from preventable causes. See  United Nations, Press Release, UN
Finds One in Twelve Children Dies Before Age Five , ICEF/1853, PI/1409, Apr. 18,
2002, available at  www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2002/ICEF1853.doc.htm.  Of the ap-
proximately 6 billion people in the world, 1.1 billion lack access to safe drinking
water (12 million die from lack of water), 2.4 billion lack basic sanitation, and 1.2
billion live on less than U.S. $1 per day. BREAD FOR THE WORLD, HUNGER BASICS:
INTERNATIONAL FACTS ON HUNGER AND POVERTY, at  www.bread.org/hungerbas
ics/international.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2003).
2 See  Bernard Neitschmann, The Fourth World: Nations Versus States, in REOR-
DERING THE WORLD: GEOPOLITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE TWENTY-FIRST CEN-
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guages and their attendant cultures, knowledge, and world views
will disappear,3 along with hundreds of plant and animal species.4
Vast swaths of land have been rendered uninhabitable by the re-
lentless quest for “progress.”5  Every day the newspapers report
impending environmental disasters, the spread of AIDS, slavery
and child labor, racial and religious repression, and the disap-
pearance, torture, and murder of political dissidents around the
world.
As the world’s unrivaled military, economic, and political su-
perpower, the United States plays a significant role, direct and
indirect, in the perpetuation of much of this human misery.  Even
so, within the United States, which has only 5% of the world’s
population but consumes 25 or 30% of its resources,6 the top 1%
of the population controls nearly 40% of the country’s wealth,7
TURY 225-42 (George J. Demko & William B. Wood eds., 1994) (noting that less
than 200 international states occupy, suppress, and exploit more than 5000 nations
and peoples, and that since World War II, state-nation conflicts have produced the
most numerous and longest wars, as well as the greatest number of civilian casualties
and refugees).
3 DANIEL NETTLE & SUZANNE ROMAINE, VANISHING VOICES: THE EXTINCTION
OF THE WORLD’S LANGUAGES 40 (2000).
4 See  Joby Warrick, Mass Extinction Underway, Majority of Biologists Say , WASH.
POST, Apr. 21, 1998, at A4 (noting that at least one in eight plant species is
threatened with extinction, and that nearly all biologists polled attributed the losses
to human activity); see also THE TURNING POINT PROJECT, EXTINCTION CRISIS,
available at  www.turnpoint.org/extinction.pdf (last visited Feb. 11, 2003) (noting that
species are dying at 10,000 times their natural extinction rate).
5 See WARD CHURCHILL, Geographies of Sacrifice:  The Radioactive Colonization
of Native North America , in STRUGGLE FOR THE LAND: NATIVE NORTH AMERICAN
RESISTANCE TO GENOCIDE, ECOCIDE AND COLONIZATION 239-91 (2002) (describing
federal plans to turn Indian lands contaminated by uranium mining into “National
Sacrifice Areas”); see also ALTERNATIVE ENERGY INSTITUTE, INC., Effects of the
Current and Future Population On . . . , in POPULATION, at  www.altenergy.org/2/pop
ulation/effects/effects.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2003) (noting that “[d]esertification
is claiming 29% of the earth’s total landmass”).
6 Arlie Russell Hochschild, A Generation Without Public Passion , THE ATLANTIC
MONTHLY, Feb. 2001 (citing a 30% consumption rate and noting also that the
United States produces 25% of the world’s pollution), available at  www.theatlantic.
com/issues/2001/02/hochschild.htm. See also U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2000 STATISTI-
CAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, tbl. 1390, “Energy Consumption and Pro-
duction by Country, 1990 and 1998” (showing that in 1998 the United States
accounted for approximately 25% of the world’s total energy consumption, with a
per capita consumption rate nearly six times the world average), available at  www.
census.gov/prod/2001pubs/statab/sec30.pdf; NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUN-
CIL, A RESPONSIBLE ENERGY POLICY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY, available at  www.
nrdc.org/air/energy/rep/execsum.asp (last visited Feb. 11, 2003).
7 EDWARD N. WOLFF, TOP HEAVY: A STUDY OF THE INCREASING INEQUALITY
OF WEALTH IN AMERICA 7 (1995) (also noting that disparities in both income and
wealth have increased since the late 1970s); see also  William Lucy, Time to Fight—
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and those at the bottom face malnutrition, infant mortality, and
unemployment rates equal to those of many “third world” coun-
tries.8  Despite the best efforts of Hollywood, the “news” media,
and most elected officials to convince us otherwise, the reality is
that we have the poorest public education and health care in the
industrialized world,9 and the second highest per capita incarcer-
ation rate anywhere.10  Eighty percent of those charged with seri-
ous crimes are unable to afford a lawyer,11 and African
American parents know their sons have a one-in-three chance of
ending up in prison.12  Reservation-based American Indian par-
ents know their children face the country’s highest infant mortal-
ity and teenage suicide rates, 60 to 90% unemployment rates,
and, statistically, can expect to live only into their mid- to late-
Again , AFSCME PUBLICATIONS, Jan./Feb. 1997 (noting that the top 10% controls
nearly 70% of the wealth), at  www.afscme.org/publications/public_employee/1997/
pejf9702.htm.
8 See infra  text accompanying notes 9 and 13.
9 On health care, see System Overload:  Pondering the Ethics of America’s Health
Care System , 3 ISSUES IN ETHICS (Summer 1990) (noting that the United States is
“[u]nique among the industrialized democracies” in retaining a free market health
system), at  www.scu.edu/Ethics/publications/iie/v3n3/system.html; see also  Kempe
Ronald Hope, Sr., Child Survival and Health Care Among Low-Income African
American Families in the United States , 2 HEALTH TRANSITION REV. 151-62 (1992)
(noting that a baby born in Cuba has a greater chance of survival than an African
American baby born in Washington, D.C.); Thomas L. Milne, Testimony to the Insti-
tute of Health Committee on Assuring the Health of the Public in the 21st Century
(Feb. 8, 2001), www.naccho.org/advocacydoc287.cfm [hereinafter Milne, Testimony].
On literacy, see Statistics on Adult Literacy , ORANGE COUNTY REGISTER, Sept. 22,
2002, available at  2002 WL 5460682 (noting that according to the U.N., the United
States is forty-ninth in world literacy, and forty-four million adults are functionally
illiterate); see also Report:  State Spending on Prisons Grows at 6 Times Rate of
Higher Ed, U.S. NEWSWIRE, Aug. 22, 2002, available at  2002 WL 22070708.
10 This means that the United States, with 5% of the world’s population, accounts
for 25% of its prisoners. See Anger Grows at U.S. Jail Population , BBC NEWS, Feb.
15, 2000, available at  news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americans/643363.stm.
11 CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, DEFENSE COUNSEL IN
CRIMINAL CASES, Nov. 2000, NCJ 179023, available at  www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/
pdf/dccc.pdf; see also SOUTHERN CENTER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, PROMISES TO KEEP:
ACHIEVING FAIRNESS AND EQUAL JUSTICE FOR THE POOR IN CRIMINAL CASES,
Nov. 2000 (report on file with author).
12 See  Michael A. Fletcher, ‘Crisis’ of Black Males Gets High-Profile Look:
Rights Panel Probes Crime, Joblessness, Other Ills , WASH. POST, Apr. 17, 1999, at A2
(noting that in some states one in two black men are “under the supervision of the
criminal justice system”); see generally DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE
AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1999); JEROME G.
MILLER, SEARCH AND DESTROY: AFRICAN AMERICAN MALES IN THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM (1996); MARC MAUER & TRACY HULING, THE SENTENCING PRO-
JECT, YOUNG BLACK AMERICANS AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM:  FIVE
YEARS LATER (1995).
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forties.13  Every night, hundreds of homeless people sleep on the
streets of every major American city.14
All of this seems to be quite acceptable to those who have the
most influence.  Information about all of these situations is
widely available and, in most cases, we know what could be done
to solve or ameliorate these problems.15  What stands in the way
of their resolution is not lack of awareness or resources, but the
priorities of those in power and those who keep them there.16
For many who benefit—or believe they benefit—from the sta-
tus quo, living in denial is apparently a viable option.  A mind-
boggling number of Americans seem to accept that if “those peo-
ple” would just act more like “us,” they, too, would soon be en-
joying the “good life.”  Others find that we must struggle against
such policies and practices; sometimes because our very lives or
the lives of our children depend on it, sometimes simply to retain
13 See RENNARD STRICKLAND, TONTO’S REVENGE: REFLECTIONS ON AMERICAN
INDIAN CULTURE AND POLICY 47 (1997); Ward Churchill, Unraveling the Codes of
Oppression, in FANTASIES OF THE MASTER RACE: LITERATURE, CINEMA AND THE
COLONIZATION OF AMERICAN INDIANS xiv-xix (2d ed., City Lights Books 1998)
(1992).
14 See  Paul Shepard, ‘State of Cities’ Study Released , ASSOCIATED PRESS, June 19,
1998 (quoting Andrew Cuomo, U.S. Secretary of Housing and Urban Development,
saying that “an estimated 600,000 Americans still sleep on our streets every night”).
15 Advocacy groups and experts in each of these areas are consistently producing
reports detailing workable solutions.  Thus, for example, ninety percent of the dis-
eases in developing countries result from a lack of clean water.  Roger Segelken,
Mass Starvation, Disease Will Be the Inevitable Results of Population Growth , COR-
NELL NEWS, Feb. 9, 1996, available at  www.news.cornell.edu/releases/Feb96/aaaspi
mentel.hrs.html.  Deaths caused by malnutrition result not from an inadequate
global supply of food but from its unequal distribution. FOOD AND AGRICULTURE
ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS, MAPPING OF THE FOOD SUPPLY GAP
1998, available at  http://www.fao.org (last visited Apr. 18, 2003).
It has been well established that money is most effectively spent on preventive
health care, but less than two percent of the American health care dollar is so di-
rected. See  Milne, Testimony, supra  note 9 (noting that half the annual deaths in the
United States are preventable).  Similarly, studies show that money spent on educa-
tion cuts the fiscal as well as social costs of incarceration, but education budgets
continue to be cut and prison funding expanded. See Use Our Resources Wisely ,
COLUMBUS LEDGER-ENQUIRER, Oct. 5, 2002 (noting that between 1980 and 1995,
the U.S. education budget dropped from $27 billion to $16 billion while the prison
budget grew from $8 billion to $20 billion), available at  2002 WL 1835826.
16 See, for example, the statement of then U.N. Ambassador, soon to be Secretary
of State Madeline Albright, who responded to U.N. reports that U.S.-imposed sanc-
tions on Iraq had by 1996 already caused the deaths of 500,000 Iraqi children by
stating, “this is a very hard choice, but . . . we think the price is worth it.” 60 Min-
utes:  Punishing Saddam  (CBS television broadcast May 12, 1996). See also
Arundhati Roy, The Algebra of Infinite Justice , THE GUARDIAN, Sept. 29, 2001,
available at  2001 WL 28346627 (quoting Albright).
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our humanity.  Such struggles take many forms, but all require
the freedom to articulate the problems and potential solutions
and the ability to organize socially and politically.  Fortunately,
such freedoms have not only been acknowledged historically, but
are clearly articulated in the U.S. Constitution17 and are spelled
out in more detail in universally recognized international law.18
When the government that purports to represent us engages in
genocide, war crimes, or other actions calculated to perpetuate
the systematic oppression of large groups of people,19 we not
only have the right to challenge such actions, but the legal re-
sponsibility to do so.  This was the primary message of the Nu-
remberg and Tokyo Tribunals—when a government engages in
basic violations of the most fundamental human rights, it is the
citizens’ obligation under international law to stop those viola-
tions.  The fact that the government’s domestic law may deem
such policies or practices legal—or resistance to them illegal—
does not change this fundamental principle.20
17 See U.S. CONST. amends. I, IV, V, VI, VIII, XIII, XIV, XV.
18 The U.N. Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, U.N.G.A. Res.
217 A(III), at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948), and numerous international conventions
articulate the basic human right to life, food, shelter, education, medical care, cul-
tural integrity, freedom from discrimination, and, most importantly, self-determina-
tion.  State protection of the right to struggle to achieve these ends is made
mandatory by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Annex to
G.A. Res. 2200, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) (ratified by
the United States in 1992) and other treaties which spell out the right to hold and
express opinions and to participate in public affairs, to freedom of association and
assembly, to freedom from arbitrary arrest or detention, and to due process of law.
This law is found not only in such treaties, but also in customary international law
which is recognized as binding on the United States. See , e.g. , Filartiga v. Peña-
Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (enforcing the prohibition of torture found in cus-
tomary law); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 694 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (recognizing
the causing of disappearance as a violation of customary international law); see gen-
erally LOUIS HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS (1990).
19 For examples of such policies, see generally WILLIAM BLUM, ROGUE STATE: A
GUIDE TO THE WORLD’S ONLY SUPERPOWER (2002); NOAM CHOMSKY & EDWARD
S. HERMAN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF HUMAN RIGHTS, VOL. I: THE WASHING-
TON CONNECTION AND THIRD WORLD FASCISM (1979); WARD CHURCHILL, A LIT-
TLE MATTER OF GENOCIDE: HOLOCAUST AND DENIAL IN THE AMERICAS: 1492 TO
THE PRESENT (1998) [hereinafter CHURCHILL, A LITTLE MATTER OF GENOCIDE];
DOUGLAS V. PORPORA, HOW HOLOCAUSTS HAPPEN: THE UNITED STATES IN CEN-
TRAL AMERICA (1990).
20 It is the fundamental duty of the citizen to resist and to restrain the vio-
lence of the State.  Those who choose to disregard this responsibility can
justly be accused of complicity in war crimes, which is itself designated as
“a crime under international law” in the Principles of the Charter of
Nuremberg.
Noam Chomsky, Preface  to AGAINST THE CRIME OF SILENCE: PROCEEDINGS OF
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It is in this context that we must assess recent “antiterrorism”
legislation such as the so-called “USA PATRIOT” Act.21  We are
told that such laws impose some restrictions on our liberties but
are necessary for our security.22  In this Essay, I hope to demon-
strate that such legislation needs to be understood in the context
of the United States’ long history of using both the law and law
enforcement agencies to repress individuals and organizations
who struggle for social justice.  Such repression has affected all
who dissent politically in order to change the status quo and
force the government to respect fundamental human rights.23
The current policies of the U.S. government threaten to silence
all who dissent, regardless of the issues or the tactics chosen.  The
harm embodied in the current legislation and the broad powers it
gives the executive branch is not merely the silencing of political
opinion.  As such, the question is not whether we will be allowed
to put our opinions out into some abstract “marketplace of
ideas,” but whether we will allow the government of the United
States, in the name of “our security,” to crush struggles for the
most basic of human rights.  If we allow ourselves to be dis-
tracted into a debate about which liberties we are willing to sacri-
fice for the sake of more security, we will sacrifice both the
liberty and the security of those who take political positions, or
represent social movements, not approved of by those in power.
I
SECURITY OR SILENCING?
In the twenty-first century, only nations that share a commit-
ment to protecting basic human rights and guaranteeing politi-
cal and economic freedom will be able to unleash the potential
of their people and assure their future prosperity.  People ev-
erywhere want to be able to speak freely; choose who will gov-
THE INTERNATIONAL WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL, at xxiv (John Duffett ed., 1968). See
generally STEPHEN R. RATNER & JASON S. ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS ATROCITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: BEYOND THE NUREMBERG LEGACY
(1997); MICHAEL R. MARRUS, THE NUREMBERG WAR CRIMES TRIAL, 1945-46: A
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (1997).
21 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act), Pub. L. No.
107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (signed into law Oct. 26, 2001).
22 See generally  John W. Whitehead & Steven H. Aden, Forfeiting “Enduring
Freedom” for “Homeland Security”:  A Constitutional Analysis of the USA Patriot
Act and the Justice Department’s Anti-Terrorism Initiatives , 51 AM. U. L. REV. 1081
(2002); Roy, supra  note 16.
23 See infra  Parts II-IV.
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ern them . . . and enjoy the benefits of their labor.  These
values of freedom are right and true for every person, in every
society—and the duty of protecting these values against their
enemies is the common calling of freedom-loving people
across the globe and across the ages.
—George W. Bush, September 17, 200224
In March 2002, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU)
Foundation of Colorado held a press conference in which it re-
vealed that the Denver Police Department was monitoring the
peaceful protest activities of Denver-area residents and keeping
files on the First Amendment-protected expressive, lawful activi-
ties of advocacy organizations.25  In support of its allegations, the
ACLU released excerpts from computerized police files which
catalogued the physical characteristics, names, addresses, phone
numbers, vehicles, and activities of persons involved in peaceful
organizational activities and demonstrations, as well as informa-
tion about their spouses and associates.26
Groups such as End the Politics of Cruelty and the American
Friends Service Committee—a Nobel Peace Prize-winning
Quaker organization—were labeled “Criminal Extremist” with-
out any reference to criminal activity.  Individuals were named
for having attended meetings or simply being a phone contact for
others in the file.  Antonia Anthony was identified not as the
Franciscan nun that she is, but as an “active protestor” with the
Chiapas Coalition which, in turn, was falsely described as a
“[g]roup dedicated to [the] overthrow of [the] Mexican govern-
ment.”27  Subsequently, the Denver police admitted to having
over 3400 such “spy files,” most of them compiled since 1999 but
containing information dating back to 1972.28  Subsequent disclo-
24 George W. Bush, National Security Strategy of the United States (Sept. 17,
2002), www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nssall.html.
25 See  Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Colorado,
ACLU Calls for Denver Police to Stop Keeping Files on Peaceful Protesters (Mar.
11, 2002), at  http://www.aclu-co.org/news/pressrelease/release-spyfiles.htm; Sarah
Huntley, Cops Have ‘Spy File,’ Groups Say , ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Mar. 12,
2002, at 5A; see also NANCY CHANG, SILENCING POLITICAL DISSENT: HOW POST-
SEPTEMBER 11 ANTI-TERRORISM MEASURES THREATEN OUR CIVIL LIBERTIES 120-
21 (2002).
26 See attachments to Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union Foundation
of Colorado, supra  note 25, at  http://www.aclu-co.org/spyfiles/samplefiles.htm.
27 Id.  In fact, the Chiapas Coalition’s purpose is to support the legitimate strug-
gles of indigenous peoples in Mexico.
28 John C. Ensslin, ‘Spy Files’ Too Broad, Webb Says , ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS,
Mar. 14, 2002, at 4A. See also  Complaint filed in Am. Friends Serv. Comm. v. City
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sures reveal that such information, and misinformation, has been
disseminated to numerous other law enforcement agencies.29
In the meantime, on October 23, 2001, the Uniting and
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Re-
quired to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT)
Act30 was introduced in Congress.  Within three days, the Act,
which contains 158 separate sections dramatically expanding the
government’s law enforcement and intelligence gathering pow-
ers, was passed by both the House and the Senate and signed
into law by President George W. Bush.31
Among other things, the USA PATRIOT Act (hereinafter the
“2001 Act”) greatly expands the surveillance authority of  federal
agencies; further limits the rights of immigrants; blurs the line
between criminal and intelligence investigations; and creates a
new and very broadly defined crime of “domestic terrorism.”32
Passed in the wake of the September 11 attacks on the World
Trade Center and the Pentagon, Attorney General John Ashcroft
and other officials assure us that the 2001 Act embodies a neces-
sary trade off of some individual liberties for the collective secur-
ity of the nation.33  In this construction, the “liberties” being
curtailed are generally thought of as the rights of speech, associa-
tion, and the press articulated in the First Amendment,34 and the
freedom from unreasonable search and seizure and the right to
privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment.35  “Security” in
this context implies the protection of persons and property from
physical assault, but it is also extended to a broader notion of
protecting the institutions which embody American “democ-
racy.”  In essence, the administration is making a broader version
of the argument Abraham Lincoln made when suspending the
constitutionally guaranteed writ of habeas corpus:  “Are all the
& County of Denver (Mar. 28, 2002), available at  www.aclu-co.org/spyfiles/Docu
ments/ClassActionComplaint.pdf.
29 See , e.g. , files released on the American Indian Movement indicating that
(mis)information had been disseminated to at least a dozen other agencies (copy on
file with author).
30 See supra  note 21.
31 This history of the bill can be found at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?
d107:HR03162:@@@L&summ2& (last visited Feb. 10, 2003).
32 See infra  Part VI.
33 See sources cited supra  note 22.
34 See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
35 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  The inclusion of privacy rights was articulated in
Katz v. United States , 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (holding that the Fourth Amendment
protects persons and their privacy interests, not simply places and things).
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laws, but one, to go unexecuted, and the government itself to go
to pieces, lest that one be violated?”36
While the 2001 Act has been vociferously criticized by many
civil liberties advocates, the basic framing of the question as one
of balancing liberty against security interests has not been effec-
tively challenged.  Instead, the debate has focused on where the
line should be drawn, legally and politically, with most critics of
the 2001 Act arguing that liberties are being unconstitutionally
curtailed but not challenging the underlying premise that the
goal is increased security.  This is a very dangerous and mislead-
ing construction.  Historically, the liberties at issue have been
systematically sacrificed not to ensure the security of the general
public, but to suppress political movements and sectors of the
population which are viewed as threats to the status quo.  What
has been sacrificed is not just people’s ability to speak openly or
be free from surveillance but, in many cases, their very lives and
freedom.
It has been well-documented by the Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence, as well as by hundreds of thousands of docu-
ments released under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA),37
that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Central Intel-
ligence Agency (CIA), the National Security Administration
(NSA), and dozens of other federal, state, and local agencies
have engaged in illegal and unconstitutional actions against U.S.
citizen and noncitizen residents in an effort to silence political
dissent.  The FBI’s COINTELPRO operations (1956-1971) are
perhaps the best known, but these represent just one dimension
of the ongoing political repression which has involved not just
illegal surveillance and infiltration, but tactics designed to “dis-
rupt and destroy” organizations, ranging from the manufacture
of conflict among individuals and groups to the deliberate fram-
ing of people for crimes they did not commit, and—when all else
failed—the outright murder of activists.38  As the Denver “spy
36 Abraham Lincoln, Message to Congress, July 4, 1861, quoted in WILLIAM H.
REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME (1998).  This
action was subsequently held to be unconstitutional in Ex parte Milligan , 71 U.S. 2
(1866).
37 See  Freedom of Information Act, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (1974) (codi-
fied as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1994)).  For recent developments concerning the
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), see Wendy Goldberg, Recent Decisions , Free-
dom of Information Act , 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 748 (2000).
38 See infra  Part IV.B.
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files” indicate, groups that engage in lawful political dissent are
still being actively and illegally targeted by those entrusted with
upholding the law and the Constitution.
When we look at the 2001 Act in the context of the federal
government’s actual use of its law enforcement and intelligence
gathering powers, we see that these expanded powers have long
been sought—and frequently used, even when illegal—by the ex-
ecutive branch.  People engaged in political dissent that is sup-
posed to be protected by the First Amendment, and communities
of color generally, have not been made more “secure” in any
sense of the term, but have been subjected to physical attacks on
their persons and property by the very agencies that are now be-
ing given expanded powers under the 2001 Act.  As Robert Jus-
tin Goldstein says in his seminal work, Political Repression in
Modern America From 1870 to 1976 :
The holders of certain  ideas in the United States have been
systematically and gravely discriminated against and subjected
to extraordinary treatment by governmental authorities, such
as physical assaults, denials of freedom of speech and assem-
bly, political deportations and firings, dubious and discrimina-
tory arrests, intense police surveillance, and illegal burglaries,
wiretaps and interception of mail.39
Goldstein goes on to point out that governments can carry out
politically repressive activities following “legal” procedures or by
utilizing means that are illegal under the country’s laws.40  It goes
without saying that it is easier and more convenient for govern-
ments to use means that are at least facially lawful.  The 2001 Act
is most accurately seen as the latest step in the U.S. government’s
ongoing effort to legitimize unconstitutional practices by using
the current “war on terror,” perceived and promoted as a na-
tional security crisis, to obtain their legislative sanction.  Legisla-
tion does not, of course, make such practices “lawful” in the
deeper sense of the term.  Actions which contravene the Consti-
tution and fundamental principles of international human rights
law—even if sanctioned by the executive, the legislature, or the
judiciary—violate the rule of law and undermine the legitimacy
of the governing power.41
39 ROBERT JUSTIN GOLDSTEIN, POLITICAL REPRESSION IN MODERN AMERICA
FROM 1870 TO 1976, at xxi (rev. ed. University of Illinois Press 2001) (introduction
to 1978 edition).
40 Id.  at xxx.
41 To note only the most glaring example in modern history, we have no trouble
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The actual history of federal “law enforcement” and “intelli-
gence” agencies reveals a deeply disturbing pattern of the use of
the armed might and financial resources of the state to destroy
individuals and organizations deemed politically undesirable.
We must assess the 2001 Act in light of this history—the concrete
use of just such powers by the very agencies now being given
broader prerogative—and in light of the fundamental principles
of constitutional and international law that give the government
the right to act at all.  The question is not whether we are willing
to have our shoes x-rayed at the airport to prevent planes from
being hijacked.42  It is whether we are willing to give carte
blanche to agencies which, according to their own records, have
used every means at their disposal to silence us.
The United States’ use of the “law” to suppress political dis-
sent is a complex one that dates back to the beginning of the
republic.  In this Essay, I present only a brief sketch of a few
aspects of that history that highlight the need to examine the
2001 Act in a much more critical framework than the choice of
“liberty vs. security.”  This is a history that involves the military
as well as federal, state, and local law enforcement and intelli-
gence agencies, but for the sake of simplicity I focus primarily on
the FBI.  Part II presents a brief overview of the early history of
the suppression of political dissent and movements for social
change in this country.  Part III outlines the emergence of the
FBI’s role in this process, and Part IV looks in more detail at its
COINTELPRO (COunter INTELligence PROgram) operations.
Part V briefly outlines the “antiterrorist” legislation of the recent
decades as the more immediate context for the specific provi-
sions of the 2001 USA PATRIOT Act which is discussed in Part
VI.  Part VII concludes that if this is, in fact, to be a democracy, it
recognizing that the myriad of laws enacted by the German government in the 1930s
and 1940s did not mean that its repressive measures comported with the rule of law.
See generally DAVID DYZENHAUS, LEGALITY AND LEGITIMACY: CARL SCHMITT,
HANS KELSEN AND HERMANN HELLER IN WEIMAR (1997); Matthew Lippman, Law,
Lawyers, and Legality in the Third Reich:  The Perversion of Principle and Profes-
sionalism , 11 TEMP. INT’L & COM. L.J. 199 (1997) (discussing the role of lawyers in
the repressive legal regime of Nazi Germany); Eli Nathans, Legal Order as Motive
and Mask:  Franz Schlegelberger and the Nazi Administration of Justice , 18 LAW &
HIST. REV. 281 (2000) (using Schlegelberger, state secretary of the Reich Ministry of
Justice, as a case study of why legal administrators participated in the Nazi regime).
42 Such “security” measures need to be challenged on the ground that they do not
enhance security and because they contribute to the mindless acceptance of the reg-
ulation of everyday life by the state.  Nonetheless, they are not the primary problem
with the enhanced powers being given to law enforcement agencies.
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is our responsibility to ensure that the law is used to protect, not
repress, those who exercise their rights to political dissent em-
bodied in the Constitution and in international human rights law.
II
SUPPRESSING MOVEMENTS FOR SOCIAL CHANGE:
A BRIEF OVERVIEW
It is extremely dangerous to exercise the constitutional right of
free speech in a country fighting to make the world safe for
democracy.
—Eugene Debs43
A. National Security and the Rule of Law
A government’s right to protect the national security, i.e., to
protect the state from both internal and external threats to its
existence, is generally accepted as a given.  However, the right to
take otherwise repressive measures exists only to the extent that
the threat is real, the state is exercising a legitimate sovereignty,
and the government acts in accordance with the rule of law.
In the international community, “states” only exist as sover-
eign entities by virtue of mutual recognition.  Recognition as a
sovereign state under international law requires legitimate con-
trol over the territory occupied by the state and the peoples who
reside in that territory.44  As the white minority regime in Rho-
desia discovered in 1965, simply controlling a geographic area
and its population and proclaiming itself a state is not suffi-
cient.45  One of the fundamental principles of international law is
that a state’s sovereignty does not extend to the unlawfully occu-
43 Ramsey Clark, Preface  to Notes on War and Freedom , in MICHAEL LINFIELD,
FREEDOM UNDER FIRE: U.S. CIVIL LIBERTIES IN TIMES OF WAR, at xvii (1990)
(quoting Eugene Debs on his way to prison for opposing the United States’ partici-
pation in World War I).
44 U.S. Secretary of State James Baker, in a 1991 address to the Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe, stated that criteria to be considered in the
recognition of new states included support for democracy and the rule of law, the
safeguarding of human rights, and respect for international law and obligations.  Tes-
timony of Ralph Johnson, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and
Canadian Affairs (Oct. 17, 1991) 2 FOREIGN POL’Y BULL. 39, 42 (Nov./Dec. 1991),
quoted in LOUIS HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 250
(3d ed. 1993).
45 See  United Nations Security Council Resolution Concerning Southern Rhode-
sia, Nov. 20, 1965, S.C. Res. 217, SCOR, Resolutions and Decisions at 8, which
“[c]ondemns the usurpation of power by a racist settler minority in southern Rhode-
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pied territory of another state or nation, and the latter state or
nation has the right to struggle for self-determination.46  States,
of course, often continue to exist despite changes of government.
To be legitimate, the government must comply with the rule of
law as embodied in both international law and the state’s domes-
tic legal structures.
The rule of law has both substantive and procedural dimen-
sions.  At a minimum, it substantively requires a state’s legal sys-
tem to incorporate the most fundamental principles of
international law; it procedurally requires that the law can be
known by the people and is applied predictably and equitably.
Thus, for the United States to legitimately act in the name of
“national security,” the country  must be lawfully sovereign over
the territory, resources, and peoples that it claims; the U.S. gov-
ernment must be complying with the rule of law, both the inter-
national law that creates the sovereign state and the U.S.
Constitution that provides for the existence and legitimacy of its
government; and it must be responding to a real threat.
B. Early Suppression of Struggles for Justice
As we begin to analyze the American government’s use of its
law enforcement powers, we must keep in mind the distinction
between threats to a lawful state or government, i.e., legitimate
threats to the national security, and threats to the status quo.  Al-
though the United States has proclaimed itself to be a “freedom-
loving” democracy since the beginning of the republic, we have
consistently seen “national security” invoked to suppress legiti-
mate movements for social and political change.  If the United
States is asserting control of land, resources, or peoples over
which it does not have legitimate jurisdiction, as in the case of
many American Indian nations and external colonies such as Pu-
erto Rico, those who seek to challenge this control may not ap-
propriately be deemed threats to the national security.  Likewise,
sia and regards the declaration of independence by it as having no legal validity. . . .”
reproduced in HENKIN ET AL., supra  note 44, at 257-58.
46 See JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 105
(1979) (“Where a particular territory is a self-determination unit as defined, no gov-
ernment will be recognized which comes into existence and seeks to control the
territory as a State in violation of self-determination.”); see also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) of the FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 201 Comment
b  (noting that a state does not cease to be a state because it is occupied by a foreign
power).
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if the United States government is denying basic human rights to
people within its jurisdiction, it cannot legitimately claim to be
protecting the national interest when it represses protest against
such policies.  Furthermore, if people are exercising their lawful
right to effect democratic change, their actions are not appropri-
ately characterized as threats to the national security.
Nonetheless, since the founding of the republic, we have seen
state power used to repress movements for social, racial, and eco-
nomic justice, as well as movements for self-determination.  The
Constitution protected the institution of slavery in numerous
ways, including a ban on the prohibition of the slave trade before
1808,47 the requirement that non-slaveholding states return fugi-
tive slaves,48 and the increased proportional representation given
to slaveholders by the “three-fifths” clause.49  In addition, one of
the reasons Congress was given the power of “calling forth the
Militia” to “suppress Insurrections” was to enlist the power of
the federal government in crushing slave rebellions.50
Few Americans would now contest the right of the people,
both those who were enslaved and those who were not, to speak
out against slavery and to organize to change the government’s
policy of support for the institution.  Nevertheless, many jurisdic-
tions considered it seditious to advocate the abolition of slavery
and in certain periods the Postmaster General refused to allow
abolitionist literature to be sent through the mail.51  Despite the
First Amendment’s explicit protection of the right of the people
“to petition the Government for a redress of grievances,”52 the
House of Representative enacted a “gag rule” under which it al-
47 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1.  This is one of the few provisions of the Constitu-
tion that cannot be amended. See U.S. CONST. art. V.
48 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3.
49 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.  Contrary to popular understanding, this did not
mean that enslaved Africans were considered “three-fifths” of a person.  As articu-
lated by the Supreme Court in Scott v. Sandford , 60 U.S. 393 (1856), they were not
considered persons at all.  This clause simply meant that citizens of the slaveholding
states had more congressional representation than those of non-slaveholding states.
50 See  Paul Finkelman, A Covenant with Death:  Slavery and the U.S. Constitution ,
AMERICAN VISIONS, May-June 1986, at 21; see generally  Staughton Lynd, Slavery
and the Founding Fathers , in BLACK HISTORY: A REAPPRAISAL 115-31 (Melvin
Drimmer ed., 1968).
51 See  Michael Kent Curtis, The Crisis Over The Impending Crisis: Free Speech,
Slavery, and the Fourteenth Amendment , in SLAVERY AND THE LAW 161-205 (Paul
Finkelman ed., 1997) (noting laws passed to suppress anti-slavery press and speech).
52 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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lowed no discussion of the slavery question.53
With rationalizations remarkably similar to those being used
by Israel today in “defending” Jewish settlements in Palestinian
territories,54 the United States consistently invoked the security
of the nation, and of Euroamerican settlers in particular, to en-
gage in “Indian wars,” a term which disguised the fact that the
military was being used to crush the efforts of American Indian
nations to enforce existing treaties and protect their  national se-
curity.55  The U.S. government’s own Indian Claims Commission,
established in 1946 to “quiet title” to lands expropriated from
Indian nations, reluctantly concluded in the 1970s that the
United States still does not have good title to at least one-third of
what it claims as its territory.56  This acknowledgment should
serve to make us much more critical of the government’s at-
tempts to justify the “Indian wars” and its use of force to sup-
press contemporary struggles for the recognition of American
Indian sovereignty.  It should also make us question attempts to
automatically correlate the loss of American life with a threat to
the “national security.”  If lives are lost as a result of illegitimate
governmental activity, it is the government’s actions rather than
the loss of life, tragic though it may be, which should be seen as
threatening the nation’s security.
A consistently emerging theme in the suppression of political
dissent is that those who disagree with government policy are la-
beled “un-American” and, whenever possible, portrayed as
agents of foreign powers.  The Federalists who enacted the 1798
Alien and Sedition Acts57 claimed the acts were necessary be-
53 See  Curtis, supra  note 51, at 166; WINTHROP D. JORDAN, WHITE OVER BLACK:
AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOWARD THE NEGRO, 1550-1812, at 329-30 (1968).
54 For a history of such justifications and the violations of international law em-
bodied in the occupation, see generally AVI SHLAIM, THE IRON WALL: ISRAEL AND
THE ARAB WORLD (2000); NOAM CHOMSKY, FATEFUL TRIANGLE: THE UNITED
STATES, ISRAEL & THE PALESTINIANS (1999).
55 Furthermore, rather than being military engagements, these “wars” most often
consisted of the massacre of women, children, and old men. See  Ward Churchill,
‘Nits Make Lice’:  The Extermination of North American Indians, 1607-1996 , in
CHURCHILL, A LITTLE MATTER OF GENOCIDE, supra  note 19, at 129-288.
56 See WARD CHURCHILL, Charades, Anyone?  The Indian Claims Commission in
Context , in PERVERSIONS OF JUSTICE: INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND ANGLO-AMERI-
CAN LAW (2003) (noting that in 1979 the Claims Commission itself acknowledged
that the United States did not hold valid title to as much as one-third of the territory
occupied by the “lower 48” states).
57 Alien Act, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570 (1798) (amended at 41 Stat. 1008 (1920) (current
version at 8 U.S.C. § 1424 (2001)); Sedition Act, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596 (1798) (expired
1801).
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cause of the increase in U.S.-French hostility.  They accused the
Jeffersonians of being agents of France who were trying to bring
the French Revolution’s “Reign of Terror” to the United
States.58  As it turned out, only Republicans were prosecuted
under the Sedition Act, and they were clearly prosecuted for po-
litical—not security—reasons.  For example, Congressman Mat-
thew Lyon received a four month prison sentence for describing
President John Adams as “swallowed up in a continual grasp for
power, in an unbounded thirst for ridiculous pomp, foolish adula-
tion, and selfish avarice.”59
As noted below, in attacking movements for social justice, the
government has often justified its actions on the ground that
these were actually movements for anarchy or communism,
“alien” ideologies promoted by foreign powers.60  Not surpris-
ingly, the linking of political protest to “sedition” has been most
common in attempts to suppress antiwar activists.61  Some inter-
esting parallels to the impending war in Iraq, which the Bush ad-
ministration insists the United States must pursue to protect its
national interest, can be seen in the United States’ efforts to con-
quer the Philippines.
In the late 1800s, after the United States had consolidated its
control over the “lower 48” contiguous states, there was a great
deal of political debate over explicitly imperialist expansion, par-
ticularly the acquisition of “territories” such as Hawai’i, Puerto
Rico, and the Philippines.62  The conquest of the Philippines, re-
58 Richard O. Curry, Introduction to FREEDOM AT RISK: SECRECY, CENSORSHIP,
AND REPRESSION IN THE 1980S, at 3, 5 (Richard O. Curry ed., 1988) [hereinafter
Curry].
59 CHANG, supra  note 25, at 22.
60 This was also true of the suppression of the labor movement in the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries.  Union organizers were labeled “communists”
and “anarchists,” labor unrest was blamed on immigrants, and informants and
agents provocateur were frequently used to create incidents which gave government
troops and the private vigilante forces they collaborated with an excuse to crush
peaceful demonstrations for better wages and working conditions. See generally
GOLDSTEIN, supra  note 39, at 3-101; HOWARD ZINN, A PEOPLE’S HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES, 1492-PRESENT 206-89 (Cynthia Merman & Roslyn Zinn eds., 1995).
61 For a comprehensive survey of  the repression of dissent during wartime, from
the 1790s to the 1980s, see generally MICHAEL LINFIELD, FREEDOM UNDER FIRE:
U.S. CIVIL LIBERTIES IN TIMES OF WAR (1990).
62 See generally  Christina Duffy Burnett & Burke Marshall, Between the Foreign
and the Domestic: The Doctrine of Territorial Incorporation, Invented and
Reinvented , in FOREIGN IN A DOMESTIC SENSE: PUERTO RICO, AMERICAN EXPAN-
SION, AND THE CONSTITUTION 4 (Christina Duffy Burnett & Burke Marshall eds.,
2001); see also ZINN, supra  note 60, at 290-92.
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ferred to in 1902 by President Roosevelt as the most glorious war
in the nation’s history,63 involved a particularly brutal four year
campaign during which U.S. troops burned hundreds of villages
to the ground, killed perhaps one million Filipinos, herded
thousands into concentration camps, and engaged in systematic
raping, looting, and torture.64  The Philadelphia Ledger  reported:
Our men have been relentless; have killed to exterminate men,
women, children, prisoners and captives, active insurgents and
suspected people, from lads of ten and up, an idea prevailing
that the Filipino, as such, was little better than a dog. . . . Our
soldiers have pumped salt water into men to “make them
talk,” have taken prisoner people who held up their hands and
peacefully surrendered, and an hour later . . . stood them on a
bridge and shot them down one by one . . . .65
According to the correspondent reporting such facts, these tac-
tics were “necessary and long overdue,” for the enemy was not a
“civilized” people.66  Filipinos were routinely referred to as
“savages” and “niggers,”67 and the fighting as “Indian warfare.”68
It is interesting to note in the context of the current “war on
terrorism” and the impending war in Iraq, that U.S. officials con-
sistently maintained that the war in the Philippines was being
fought to bring freedom and civilization to the Filipinos.69  Fili-
63 STUART CREIGHTON MILLER, “BENEVOLENT ASSIMILATION”: THE AMERICAN
CONQUEST OF THE PHILIPPINES, 1899-1903, at 250 (1982).
64 See THE PHILIPPINES READER: A HISTORY OF COLONIALISM, NEOCOLONIAL-
ISM, DICTATORSHIP, AND RESISTANCE 5-33 (Daniel B. Schirmer & Stephen Ross-
kamm Shalom eds., 1987) (the estimate of one million Filipinos is discussed at 19)
[hereinafter THE PHILIPPINES READER]; see generally MILLER, supra  note 63.
65 MILLER, supra  note 63, at 211.
66 Id.
67 THE PHILIPPINES READER, supra  note 64, at 10.
68 This was no loose analogy, for General “Howlin’ Jake” Smith who gave the
orders to “kill and burn, kill and burn” and, when asked about the children, replied
“[e]verything [sic] over ten,” id.  at 17, was a veteran of the 1890 Wounded Knee
massacre, MILLER, supra  note 63, at 219, in which dozens of U.S. soldiers were given
the army’s medal of honor for murdering approximately 300 Lakota men, women
and children in cold blood. MARIO GONZALES & ELIZABETH COOK-LYNNE, POLIT-
ICS OF HALLOWED GROUND: WOUNDED KNEE AND THE STRUGGLE FOR INDIAN
SOVEREIGNTY 107 (1999).
69 The Salt Lake City Tribune  editorialized:
The struggle must continue til the misguided creatures there shall have
their eyes bathed in enough blood to cause their vision to be cleared, and
to understand that . . . those whom they are now holding as enemies have
no purpose toward them except to consecrate to liberty and to open for
them a way to happiness.
MILLER, supra  note 63, at 74 (quoting 18 LITERARY DIGEST 387 (1899)).  As early as
1899, General Shafter predicted, “It may be necessary to kill half of the Filipinos in
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pino resistance was portrayed as violating the rules of “civilized
warfare,” thereby preventing the Americans from comporting
with the laws of war.70  Just as U.S. officials recently denounced
Iraq’s invitations to conduct fact-finding missions as merely a
stalling tactic,71 Filipino peace proposals were dismissed as
“merely a trick” to “gain time.”72  General Douglas MacArthur
decreed that captured Filipino guerrillas would not be treated as
soldiers, but as “criminals” and “murderers” and summarily exe-
cuted,73 much as the Bush administration has said that the “un-
lawful combatants” captured in Afghanistan and held at
Guantanamo Naval Base need not be accorded prisoner of war
status.74
In a move which calls to mind provisions of the USA PA-
TRIOT Act,75 General MacArthur had a lawyer on the Philip-
pine Commission draft “Treason Laws” under which treason was
defined “as joining any secret political organization or even as
‘the advocacy of independence or separation of the islands from
the United States by forcible or peaceful means.’”76  Press criti-
cal of the war in the Philippines was routinely censored77 and
those who opposed the war were dismissed as “liars and trai-
tors.”78  As discussed in the following section, those who pro-
tested the United States’ involvement in World War I were
similarly considered treasonous or seditious and subjected to
harsh repression.
As these few vignettes illustrate, in the early history of the
order that the remaining half of the population may be advanced to a higher plane
of life than their present semi-barbarous state affords.” THE PHILIPPINES READER,
supra  note 64, at 11.
70 MILLER, supra  note 63, at 77.
71 See  Anthony Shadid, U.S. Rebuffs Second Iraq Offer on Arms Inspection , BOS-
TON GLOBE, Aug. 6, 2002, at A1 (noting that the overture “was quickly dismissed by
US officials as a stalling tactic”); see also White House Dismisses Offers by Iraq to
UN, Congress for Weapons Inspection , AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Aug. 5, 2002,
available at  2002 WL 23573867.
72 MILLER, supra  note 63, at 77.
73 Id.  at 163.
74 Katharine Q. Seelye, A Nation Challenged: Captives; Detainees Are Not
P.O.W.’s Cheney and Rumsfeld Declare , N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2002, at A6; see also
Amnesty International, USA: AI Calls On the USA to End Legal Limbo of Guantá-
namo Prisoners , Jan. 15, 2002, AI-index:  AMR51/009/2002, available at  http://web.
amnesty.org.
75 See infra  Part VI.
76 MILLER, supra  note 63, at 166.
77 Id.  at 83-87.
78 Id.  at 156.
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United States, social movements which challenged the status quo
were labeled seditious.  The threat they were said to pose to the
national security was used to justify denying First Amendment
rights to freedoms of speech and press, to peaceably assemble,
and to petition for redress of grievances.  The criminal justice sys-
tem was used to convict organizers engaged in constitutionally
protected activity and to crush otherwise popular and effective
movements for social change.  While done in the name of “law
enforcement,” such actions were, in fact, undermining the rule of
law.
As the United States entered the twentieth century, it was
against this general background that its use of federal law en-
forcement powers to suppress dissent was more effectively insti-
tutionalized within the Department of Justice and, more
particularly, in what was to become the Federal Bureau of
Investigation.
III
THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION:
ORIGINS AND EARLY ACTIVITIES
Your FBI is respected by the good citizens of America as
much as it is feared, hated and vilified by the scum of the un-
derworld, Communists, goose-stepping bundsmen, their fellow
travelers, mouthpieces, and stooges.
—J. Edgar Hoover, 194079
The Department of Justice (DOJ) was formed in 1870, and the
following year Congress appropriated $50,000 for the DOJ to en-
gage in “the detection and prosecution of those guilty of violating
Federal Law.”80  In 1906, Attorney General Bonaparte estab-
lished the Bureau of Investigation within the Justice Depart-
ment,81 despite the fact that, initially, “congressional
authorization was withheld because of the widely held view that
79 WARD CHURCHILL & JIM VANDER WALL, AGENTS OF REPRESSION: THE FBI’S
SECRET WARS AGAINST THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY AND THE AMERICAN INDIAN
MOVEMENT 4-6 (2d ed. 2002) [hereinafter CHURCHILL & VANDER WALL, AGENTS].
80 Id.  at 17 (citing United States Congress, Appropriations to the Budget of the
United States of America, 1872 , Section VII (1871) at 31).  Until Congress forbade
the practice, the DOJ employed the private Pinkerton Detective Agency, long used
by industrialists to crush labor movements, to do its investigative work. SANFORD J.
UNGER, FBI 39 (1976); GOLDSTEIN, supra  note 39, at 29.
81 UNGER, supra  note 80, at 40.
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the establishment of such an agency would lead to ‘a general sys-
tem of espionage’ and would be ‘contradictory to the democratic
principles of government.’”82  In 1910, the Bureau’s functions
were described to Congress as the enforcement of:
[T]he national banking laws, antitrust laws, peonage laws, the
bucket-shop law, the laws relating to fraudulent bankruptcies,
the impersonation of government officials with intent to de-
fraud, thefts and murders committed on government reserva-
tions, offenses committed against government property, and
those committed by federal court officials and employees, Chi-
nese smuggling, customs frauds, internal revenue frauds, post
office frauds, violations of the neutrality laws . . . land frauds
and immigration and naturalization cases.83
However, it soon took on much broader functions which demon-
strated that Congress’ initial reservations were well-founded.
During World War I, the Bureau received added funding and
personnel to investigate sabotage and violations of the Neutrality
Act, and in 1917 the Justice Department tried to convince Presi-
dent Woodrow Wilson to allow military courts martial to try civil-
ians accused of interfering with the war effort.  This failed, but
Wilson did sign the Espionage Act,84 which made it a crime to
“willfully utter, print, write, or publish any disloyal, profane,
scurrilous, or abusive language” about the United States.85  It
also criminalized any interference with the war effort and al-
lowed the post office to exclude from the mails any material ad-
vocating “treason, insurrection or resistance to any law of the
U.S.”86  The 1918 Sedition Act prohibited essentially all criticism
of the war or the government.87  While these laws did nothing
appreciable to stop sedition, they did effectively prevent those
opposing the war from exercising their First Amendment rights.
Goldstein says:
Altogether, over twenty-one hundred [persons] were indicted
under the Espionage and Sedition laws, invariably for state-
ments of opposition to the war rather than for any overt acts,
and over one thousand persons were convicted.  Over one
82 Geoffrey R. Stone, The Reagan Administration, the First Amendment, and FBI
Domestic Security Investigations , in  Curry, supra  note 58, at 272-73.
83 UNGER, supra  note 80, at 40.  Congress immediately added the “Mann Act”
designed to deter interstate prostitution. Id.
84 Espionage Act of 1917, ch. 30, 40 Stat. 217 (1918); see also UNGER, supra  note
80, at 41-42.
85 CHANG, supra  note 25, at 23.
86 GOLDSTEIN, supra  note 39, at 108 (quoting Espionage Act of June 15, 1917).
87 Id. See  Sedition Act, ch. 75, 40 Stat. 553 (1918).
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hundred persons were sentenced to jail terms of ten years or
more.  Not a single person was ever convicted for actual spy
activities.88
This has become a consistent pattern in the enforcement of “na-
tional security” laws.89
In June 1918, populist-socialist leader Eugene Debs was sen-
tenced to ten years in federal prison for violating the Espionage
Act by making an antiwar speech in which he said, “[Y]ou need
to know that you are fit for something better than slavery and
cannon fodder.”90  Charles Schenck was also convicted for print-
ing and distributing pamphlets opposing the draft.  In 1919, a
unanimous Supreme Court upheld his conviction, stating that the
government may restrict speech without violating the First
Amendment when there is a “clear and present” danger that the
speech could bring about the “substantive evils” at issue.91
Anarchist leaders Emma Goldman and Alexander Berkman
were also sentenced to ten years for violating the Espionage Act
by publicly expressing opposition to the draft.92  Goldman and
Berkman were deported in 1919 under the newly amended immi-
gration laws.  These amendments made noncitizens who were
members of organizations which advocated the unlawful destruc-
tion of property or the overthrow of the government by force or
violence deportable.  The law did not require any individualized
showing of action or even belief, thus incorporating the principle
of guilt by association93 in a manner recently replicated by the
1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility
Act.94
88 GOLDSTEIN, supra  note 39, at 113; see also LINFIELD, supra  note 61, at 33-67.
89 See infra  Part IV.
90 Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 214 (1919).
91 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).  As Nancy Chang points out,
this case is best known for Justice Holmes’ analogy to falsely “shouting fire in a
crowded theatre,” but the actions in question were better described by Howard Zinn
as “shouting, not falsely, but truly, to people about to buy tickets and enter a thea-
ter, that there was a fire raging inside.” CHANG, supra  note 25, at 23-24 (quoting
HOWARD ZINN, A PEOPLE’S HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: 1492 TO PRESENT
366 (1999)).
92 Goldman v. United States, 245 U.S. 474 (1918); see also  Edward J. Bloustein,
Criminal Attempts and the “Clear and Present Danger” Theory of the First Amend-
ment , 74 CORNELL L. REV. 1118, 1125-27 (1989); CHURCHILL & VANDER WALL,
AGENTS, supra  note 79, at 19-20.
93 GOLDSTEIN, supra  note 39, at 110.
94 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996); see generally  Kevin R. Johnson, The Antiter-
rorism Act, the Immigration Reform Act, and Ideological Regulation in the Immigra-
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During World War I, there was a dramatic increase in federal
intelligence gathering operations.  Military intelligence jumped
from two officers in 1917 to 1300 officers and civilian employees
by 1919.  There were similar increases in the intelligence divi-
sions of the Justice Department, as well as the Post Office and
the Treasury Department.95  At the same time the Justice De-
partment’s Bureau of Investigation entered into an agreement
with the American Protective League (APL), a prominent vigi-
lante organization that soon numbered 350,000 members, which
allowed these private citizens to “assist” the Bureau.96  The APL
“quickly became a largely out-of-control quasi-governmental,
quasi-vigilante agency which established a massive spy network
across the land,” making illegal arrests and detentions, instigating
attacks on activists, and infiltrating, burglarizing, wiretapping and
opening the mail of organizations they considered detrimental to
United States’ interests.97
During the early 1900s, this combination of federal agents and
APL members was instrumental in conducting large scale raids
and vigilante actions—including outright lynchings—against
members of the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW or “Wob-
blies”) across the country.  The raids, acknowledged to have been
carried out “largely as a preventative matter to prevent possible
violence,”98 were followed by pre-indictment detentions of up to
two years, mass trials in which the defendants were sometimes
not even identified by name, and the imposition of lengthy prison
sentences.  These tactics succeeded in crushing the nation’s most
powerful union movement of that era.99
The Justice Department’s involvement in quashing “subver-
sive” activities increased in the aftermath of World War I.  In
1919, there was a series of bombings around the country, includ-
tion Laws:  Important Lessons for Citizens and Noncitizens , 28 ST. MARY’S L.J. 833
(1997).
95 GOLDSTEIN, supra  note 39, at 110.
96 CHURCHILL & VANDER WALL, AGENTS, supra  note 79, at 18; GOLDSTEIN,
supra  note 39, at 111.
97 GOLDSTEIN, supra  note 39, at 111.
98 Id.  at 117 (quoting a statement of the U.S. attorney for Kansas to a Justice
Department official).
99 CHURCHILL & VANDER WALL, AGENTS, supra  note 79, at 19; GOLDSTEIN,
supra  note 39, at 117-18.  At the same time, the Justice Department and APL “vol-
unteers” conducted “slacker raids” in which an estimated 400,000 men were seized
and detained for not carrying draft cards. Id.  at 111-12.  Less than one in two hun-
dred of those arrested were actually draft resisters. UNGER, supra  note 80, at 42.
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ing one on the residence of Attorney General A. Mitchell
Palmer.  Those responsible were never identified, but anarchist
leaflets were found scattered around each site and Palmer re-
acted by declaring war on radicals and subversives.100  Palmer
created a General Intelligence Division (GID) within the Bureau
of Investigation to spearhead this effort, headed by Assistant At-
torney General Garvan and his twenty-four year old assistant, J.
Edgar Hoover.  Within three and one-half months, the GID had
compiled personal files on 60,000 individuals, a number which
soon grew to 200,000.101
Palmer lobbied Congress for peacetime sedition legislation
and when that failed he relied on the 1918 Alien Act—again con-
flating “troublemakers” with “foreigners”—to conduct numerous
raids on legal organizations such as the Communist and Commu-
nist Labor parties.  On January 2, 1920, the Bureau conducted
massive “Red raids” (later known as the “Palmer Raids”) in
thirty-three cities, arresting and holding 10,000 people, both citi-
zens and noncitizens, as “criminal anarchists.”102  Using tactics
similar to those we have seen with respect to the 1200-plus post-
September 11 detainees,103 hundreds were held for months in
harsh and squalid conditions, and denied contact with their fami-
lies, friends, and lawyers.104  When the excesses came to light,
Attorney General Palmer declared that the Fourth Amendment
did not apply to aliens and boldly stated:  “I apologize for noth-
ing that the Department of Justice has done in this matter.  I
glory in it.”105  According to Sanford Unger, one of the legacies
of the Palmer Raids was that “they demonstrated that the use of
methods that stretched and went beyond the law were a great
help and an efficient tool in undermining ‘subversives.’”106
By 1924, Hoover was in charge of the Bureau, which was soon
renamed the Federal Bureau of Investigation.107  He proclaimed
100 UNGER, supra  note 80, at 43; CHURCHILL & VANDER WALL, AGENTS, supra
note 79, at 20-22.
101 UNGER, supra  note 80, at 43.
102 Id.  at 43-44.
103 See infra  text accompanying note 308.
104 CHURCHILL & VANDER WALL, AGENTS, supra  note 79, at 22-23.  One de-
tainee, Andrea Salsedo, after being held in isolation for two months in a New York
Bureau office, was found on the pavement below the building.  According to Bureau
agents, he had jumped fourteen floors to his death. Id.
105 UNGER, supra  note 80, at 44.
106 Id.  at 45.
107 Id.  at 54-55.
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that “the bureau must be divorced from politics” and, most inter-
estingly, stated:  “It is, of course, to be remembered that the ac-
tivities of Communists and other ultra-radicals have not up to the
present time constituted a violation of federal statutes . . . and
consequently, the Department of Justice, theoretically, has no
right to investigate such activities. . . .”108  However, this was ex-
actly what Hoover proceeded to do with unprecedented vigor.
He gave priority to what became the Files and Communications
Division, which by 1975 had 6.5 million “Active Investigation”
files, an undisclosed but higher number of other files, and a
“General Index” containing about 58 million cards.  In 1930,
Hoover obtained permission to collect fingerprints, and by 1974
the Division of Identification and Information (DII) had on file
the prints of about 159 million Americans and was adding 3000
sets each day.109
One of the Bureau’s early targets was the Universal Negro Im-
provement Association (UNIA), the largest and most vibrant or-
ganization of African Americans ever to exist in this country,110
which Hoover succeeded in destroying through “a campaign
against Marcus Garvey which resulted in his frameup on false
charges, and ultimately his deportation as an ‘undesirable
alien.’”111  In the meantime, as noted by Ward Churchill and Jim
Vander Wall, “the DII kept tabs and accumulated increasing
amounts of sensitive information on all manner of socialists,
communists, union organizers, black activists, anarchists and
other ‘ultra-radicals’ as they painstakingly rebuilt their shattered
movements.”112
In 1936 Hoover obtained the President’s explicit authorization
to resume investigation of “subversive activities” in the
country.113
By 1938, the FBI had launched significant and tacitly illegal
. . . investigations of supposed subversion in [numerous] indus-
tries, as well as various educational institutions, organized la-
108 Id.  at 48-49.
109 CHURCHILL & VANDER WALL, AGENTS, supra  note 79, at 26-27.
110 See generally E. DAVID CRONON, BLACK MOSES:  THE STORY OF MARCUS
GARVEY AND THE UNIVERSAL NEGRO IMPROVEMENT ASSOCIATION (1969).
111 CHURCHILL & VANDER WALL, AGENTS, supra  note 79, at 27 (quoting Flynt
Taylor & Margaret Van Houten, Counterintelligence: A Documentary Look at
America’s Secret Police , National Lawyers Guild Task Force on Counterintelligence
and the Secret Police 3 (1978)).
112 Id.
113 Id.
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bor, assorted youth groups, black organizations, governmental
affairs and the armed forces. . . . More explicit illegality was
involved in the methods of intelligence-gathering themselves;
wiretapping . . . , bugging, mail tampering/opening and break-
ing-and-entering were a few of the expedients routinely ap-
plied by agents, whose investigative output was promptly
summarized and transmitted “upstairs” to the White
House.114
By January 1940, Hoover revived the General Intelligence Divi-
sion, announcing his intent to create an alphabetical and geo-
graphical “general index” which would allow the Bureau  to
locate anyone it wanted to investigate for “national security”
purposes at any time.115
Shortly thereafter, Congress passed the Smith Act which made
it a crime to “knowingly or willfully advocate, abet, advise or
teach the duty, necessity, desirability or propriety of overthrow-
ing or destroying any government in the United States by force
or violence, or by assassination of any officer of such govern-
ment.”116  This law extended the prohibitions on speech found in
previous sedition laws to peacetime, illustrating the government’s
intent to restrict freedom of expression in the name of national
security without limiting the scope or duration of the restrictions
and without demonstrating that the speech was likely to result in
any concrete action.
In Dennis v. United States ,117 the Supreme Court upheld the
convictions of eleven leaders of the Communist Party under the
Smith Act, using a test of whether “the gravity of the ‘evil,’ dis-
counted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free
speech as is necessary to avoid the danger.”  Even though the
Party had not used force or violence, the Court justified the con-
victions on the ground that the Party (or the “conspiracy,” as the
Court referred to it) was highly organized, and because its lead-
ers, who could not be shown to be foreign agents, were “ideologi-
cally attuned” to countries with whom the United States had
“touch-and-go” relations.118  Again, we see a similar stretching of
114 Id.  at 29 (citations omitted). See also FRANK J. DONNER, THE AGE OF SUR-
VEILLANCE: THE AIMS AND METHODS OF AMERICA’S POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE
SYSTEM 30-78 (1981).
115 UNGER, supra  note 80, at 103.
116 Alien Registration (Smith) Act of 1940, ch. 439, 54 Stat. 670 (1940) (Smith Act
is Title I of Alien Registration Act); see CHURCHILL & VANDER WALL, AGENTS,
supra  note 79, at 29; LINFIELD, supra note 61, at 75-79.
117 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
118 Id.  at 510.
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the national security rationale being invoked in the “if you’re not
with us you’re against us” rhetoric of the current war on
terrorism.119
During World War II, the U.S. government imprisoned all per-
sons of Japanese descent then living on the west coast, over
70,000 of whom were U.S. citizens, without any semblance of due
process.  Despite the fact that there was no  evidence of sabotage
or espionage by Japanese Americans, this was upheld by the Su-
preme Court as justified by “military necessity,” a claim asserted
by the military on the grounds that it had no way of distinguish-
ing the “loyal” from the “disloyal.”120
In 1947, as the United States moved from World War II into
the Cold War, President Truman issued Executive Order 9835,
authorizing the Justice Department to seek out “infiltration of
disloyal persons” within the U.S. government, again demonstrat-
ing that such measures were not to be limited to periods of actual
warfare.121  The Order required the DOJ to create a list of orga-
nizations which were “totalitarian, fascist, communist or subver-
sive . . . or seeking to alter the government of the United States
by unconstitutional means,”122 a measure similar to that author-
ized by the 1996 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act123 and expanded by the 2001 Act.124  By 1954, the Justice
Department had created a list of hundreds of organizations, and
“sympathetic association” as well as membership was considered
evidence of disloyalty.125
The Internal Security Act of 1950, also known as the McCar-
ran Act, required all members of “Communist-front” organiza-
119 See  Roy, supra  note 16; Hugo Young, A New Kind of War Means a New Kind
of Discussion , THE GUARDIAN, Sept. 27, 2001, available at  2001 WL 28345801; Dar-
ryl Fears, Deep Distrust of Government Still Simmers , WASH. POST, Oct. 29, 2001, at
A2.
120 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); see generally  Eugene V. Ros-
tow, The Japanese American Cases—A Disaster , 54 YALE L.J. 489 (1945); Eric K.
Yamamoto, Korematsu Revisited—Correcting the Injustice of Extraordinary Govern-
ment Excess and Lax Judicial Review:  Time for a Better Accommodation of National
Security Concerns and Civil Liberties , 26 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1 (1986).
121 CHURCHILL & VANDER WALL, AGENTS, supra  note 79, at 32.
122 Id .  Again, we see parallels in recent legislation which authorizes the creation
of lists of “terrorist” organizations. See infra  text accompanying notes 291-92, 354-
59.
123 See infra  text accompanying notes 291-92.
124 See infra  text accompanying notes 354-59.
125 Id.  This, too, is similar to the “guilt by association” provisions of AEDPA.
See infra  text accompanying note 295.
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tions to register with the federal government, and adopted a
proposal—which was not rescinded until 1968—that special “de-
tention centers” be established for incarcerating those so regis-
tered, without trial, any time the president chose to declare an
“internal security emergency.”126  Between 1945 and 1957, the
House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) subpoenaed
thousands of Americans for hundreds of public hearings and re-
quired them to testify about their associations with the Commu-
nist Party and their knowledge of the political activities of their
friends, neighbors and co-workers.  Those who refused to testify
were jailed for contempt.127  Although Hoover personally dis-
liked Joseph McCarthy, he worked closely with HUAC and the
McCarthyites until 1954.
During this period, the FBI placed hundreds of informants
within social and labor organizations and conducted “security in-
vestigations” of approximately 6.6 million Americans.128  The
stage was set for the next step:  the COINTELPRO operations.
IV
COINTELPRO:  “ABHORRENT IN
A FREE SOCIETY”129
Many of the techniques used [by the FBI in its COINTEL-
PRO operations] would be intolerable in a democratic society
even if all of the targets had been involved in violent activity,
but COINTELPRO went far beyond that.  The unexpressed
126 CHURCHILL & VANDER WALL, AGENTS, supra  note 79, at 33; ZINN, supra
note 60, at 423-24. See generally  Mari Matsuda, McCarthyism, The Internment and
the Contradictions of Power , 40 B.C. L. REV. 9, 19 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 9 (1998)
(joint issue) (foreword to Symposium: The Long Shadow of Korematsu).  Again, we
see parallels in the recent statement of Attorney General Ashcroft that such deten-
tion centers or concentration camps are currently being considered for the incarcera-
tion of U.S. citizens. See infra  note 307.
127 See generally CORLISS LAMONT, FREEDOM IS AS FREEDOM DOES (4th ed.
1990); Frank Wilkinson, Revisiting the “McCarthy Era”:  Looking at Wilkinson v.
United States in light of Wilkinson v. Federal Bureau of Investigation, 33 LOY. L.A.
L. REV. 681 (2000) (discussing his conviction for refusing to testify to HUAC in light
of documents the FBI was forced to produce in his FOIA action); Alan Bigel, The
First Amendment and National Security:  The Court Responds to Governmental Har-
assment of Alleged Communist Sympathizers , 19 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 885, 890
(1993).
128 CHURCHILL & VANDER WALL, AGENTS, supra  note 79, at 36.
129 SENATE SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT
TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, FINAL REPORT: INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND THE
RIGHTS OF AMERICANS, S. REP. NO. 755, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. bk. III, at 8 (1976)
[hereinafter SENATE SELECT COMM., FINAL REPORT].
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major premise of the programs was that a law enforcement
agency has the duty to do whatever is necessary to combat
perceived threats to the existing social and political order.
—Final Report of the Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence Activities130
Properly used, the term “counterintelligence” refers to efforts
to combat the “intelligence” or spying activities of foreign pow-
ers.  Officially, “the FBI’s counterintelligence functions have al-
ways been administratively lodged in its Counterintelligence
Division (CID) and [were] legally restricted to ‘hostile foreign
governments, foreign organizations and individuals connected
with them.’”131  Nonetheless, since first receiving President Tru-
man’s 1936 mandate to investigate subversive activities, Hoover
had initiated domestic counterintelligence programs within the
Bureau.  Some were officially named “COINTELPROs”
(COunter INTELligence PROgrams) and others were not, but
the term has come to refer to a broad range of FBI programs,
generally illegal, intended to repress political dissent.132  Al-
though these programs had almost nothing to do with countering
foreign intelligence, the use of the term illustrates the agency’s
proclivity to invoke the fear of external threats to the national
security while quashing domestic movements which were prima-
rily engaged in lawful—indeed, constitutionally protected—
activities.133
Even if one looks only at FBI actions between 1956 and 1971,
the period of officially acknowledged COINTELPRO opera-
tions, the scope of the operations and their sheer volume is over-
whelming.  This section will present a brief summary of how the
program was exposed, the kinds of tactics used and the move-
ments that were the primary targets, giving a few illustrative ex-
amples.  While constituting a particularly intense period of
governmental repression of political dissent, the COINTELPRO
era represents not an aberration but the logical outgrowth of the
previous use of law enforcement agencies to suppress movements
130 Id.  at 3.
131 CHURCHILL & VANDER WALL, AGENTS, supra  note 79, at 37.
132 Id.  at 37-38.
133 As the Senate report on COINTELPRO noted, “Counterintelligence pro-
gram” is a “misnomer for domestic covert action.” SENATE SELECT COMM., FINAL
REPORT, supra  note 129, at 4.
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for social change, a process that is still at work in the laws and
policies being enacted in the name of countering terrorism.
A. COINTELPRO Exposed
In 1976, the Senate Select Committee to Study Government
Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (known as the
“Church Committee” because it was chaired by Senator Frank
Church), characterized the FBI’s COINTELPRO operations as
“a secret war against those citizens it considers threats to the es-
tablished order.”134  To quote the Committee’s Final Report,
“[i]n these programs the Bureau went beyond the collection of
intelligence to secret actions designed to ‘disrupt’ and ‘neutralize’
target groups and individuals.  The techniques were adopted
wholesale from wartime counterintelligence, and ranged from
the trivial . . . to the degrading . . . and the dangerous.”135  The
Committee noted that from 1956, when the FBI officially labeled
its anti-communist efforts as a “COINTELPRO,” to 1971, when
the program was officially terminated, the FBI approved more
than 2000 COINTELPRO actions as part of “a sophisticated vigi-
lante operation aimed squarely at preventing the exercise of First
Amendment rights of speech and association, on the theory that
preventing the growth of dangerous groups and the propagation
of dangerous ideas would protect the national security and deter
violence.”136
Despite a very constricted review which was abruptly termi-
nated in mid-stream,137 the Church Committee hearings and its
four-volume Final Report provide more than enough evidence to
show that the FBI, the Central Intelligence Agency, the National
Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, Army Intelli-
gence, and numerous other federal agencies engaged in
thousands of illegal and unconstitutional operations spanning
several decades with the explicit intention of destroying social
and political movements they considered a threat to the status
134 Id.  at 77.
135 Id.  at 3; see generally BRIAN GLICK, WAR AT HOME: COVERT ACTION
AGAINST U.S. ACTIVISTS AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT (1989); NELSON
BLACKSTOCK, COINTELPRO: THE FBI’S SECRET WAR ON POLITICAL FREEDOM
(Cathy Perkus ed., 1975).
136 SENATE SELECT COMM., FINAL REPORT, supra  note 129, at 3.  The Report also
notes that COINTELPRO began “in part because of frustration with Supreme
Court rulings limiting the Government’s power to proceed overtly against dissident
groups.” Id.
137 See PETER MATTHIESSEN, IN THE SPIRIT OF CRAZY HORSE, 125-26 (1991).
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There is much that we do not know about COINTELPRO and
similar operations.  Nonetheless, what we do know is more than
sufficient to cause alarm.  The following sections focus on what is
known about FBI COINTELPROs, but it is important to re-
member that the Bureau was but one of perhaps dozens of fed-
eral agencies engaging in such practices.
B. The Tactics Employed
The illegal practices employed by the FBI in its COINTEL-
PRO operations are far too numerous to list specifically, but they
fall into several basic categories:  surveillance and infiltration,
dissemination of false information, creation of group conflict,
abuse of the criminal justice system, and collaboration in assaults
and assassinatons.139
1. Surveillance and Infiltration
One category of operations involves the acquisition of infor-
mation through illegal means, including mail interception, wire-
taps, bugs, live “tails,” break-ins and burglaries, and the use of
informants.140  The FBI has acknowledged that between 1960
and 1974 it illegally utilized over 2300 wiretaps, 697 bugs, and
57,000 mail openings.141  It is worth noting that this kind of “in-
telligence gathering” is the activity most commonly associated
with COINTELPRO—and is also the most hotly debated aspect
of the 2001 Act’s expansion of executive power142—but is, in fact,
the least  egregious of the practices involved.  Perhaps more sig-
138 SENATE SELECT COMM., FINAL REPORT, supra  note 129.
139 This categorization is based on the cogent summary of the kinds of illegal prac-
tices employed by the FBI in its COINTELPRO-type operations compiled by Ward
Churchill and Jim Vander Wall in CHURCHILL & VANDER WALL, AGENTS, supra
note 79, at 39-53, and by Ward Churchill, ‘To Disrupt, Discredit and Destroy’:  The
FBI’s Secret War Against the Black Panther Party , in LIBERATION, IMAGINATION
AND THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY 78-117 (Kathleen Cleaver & George Katsiaficas
eds., 2001) [hereinafter Churchill, To Disrupt].
140 CHURCHILL & VANDER WALL, AGENTS, supra  note 79, at 39. See generally
Clifford S. Zimmerman, Toward a New Vision of Informants:  A History of Abuses
and Suggestions for Reform , 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 81 (1994) (regarding
problems inherent in the use of informants).
141 WARD CHURCHILL & JIM VANDER WALL, THE COINTELPRO PAPERS:
DOCUMENTS FROM THE FBI’S SECRET WARS AGAINST DISSENT IN THE UNITED
STATES 304 (2d ed. 2002) [hereinafter CHURCHILL & VANDER WALL,
COINTELPRO].
142 See infra  Part VI.A-B.
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nificant than the resulting violations of privacy is the fact that
these tactics were not utilized simply for the purpose of acquiring
information, but were explicitly intended to induce “paranoia” in
movements for social change.  As Hoover stated, he wanted his
targets to believe that there was “‘an FBI agent behind every
mailbox.’”143  In other words, the executive branch of the federal
government was engaging in such activities precisely because of
the chilling effect they would have on speech and associational
activities protected by the First Amendment.
2. Dissemination of False Information
A second level of tactics employed in COINTELPRO opera-
tions encompasses the dissemination of information known to be
false.  One version, sometimes called “gray propaganda,” was the
systematic release of disinformation (i.e., false and misleading in-
formation) designed to discredit organizations in the eyes of the
public and to foster tensions between groups.144  The Church
Committee’s Final Report notes that the Bureau used “confiden-
tial sources,” i.e., unpaid informants and “friendly” media
sources “who could be relied upon not to reveal the Bureau’s
interests” to leak derogatory information about individuals and
to publish unfavorable articles and fabricated “documentaries”
about targeted groups.145  Among such groups were the Nation
of Islam, the Poor People’s Campaign, the Institute for Policy
Studies, the Southern Students Organizing Committee, and the
anti-war National Mobilization Committee.146
Another form of disinformation, known as “black propa-
ganda,” involved the fabrication of leaflets and other publica-
tions purporting to come from targeted individuals and
organizations.  Thus, for example, the FBI had an infiltrator in
the Sacramento chapter of the Black Panther Party (BPP) pro-
duce a coloring book for children which promoted racism and
violence.  Although the Panther leadership immediately ordered
it destroyed, the Bureau mailed copies to companies which had
been contributing food to the Panthers’ Breakfast for Children
program to get them to withdraw their support.147  Such
143 CHURCHILL & VANDER WALL, AGENTS, supra  note 79, at 39-40.
144 Id.  at 43-44.
145 SENATE SELECT COMM., FINAL REPORT, supra  note 129, at 35-36.
146 Id.
147 CHURCHILL & VANDER WALL, COINTELPRO, supra  note 141, at 159.
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\81-4\ORE406.txt unknown Seq: 33 30-SEP-03 14:56
Whose Liberty?  Whose Security? 1083
fabrications did much to promote the image of the BPP as violent
“cop-killers,” an impression still widely held by the American
public.148
In another example, FBI artists, imitating the drawing styles
used by the BPP and a Black cultural nationalist organization
known as the United Slaves (US), created a series of leaflets in
which each organization appeared to be advocating the elimina-
tion of the other’s leadership.149  The FBI’s intent can be seen in
this excerpt from a 1969 report on its San Diego operations:
In view of the recent killing of BPP member Sylvester Bell, a
new cartoon is being considered in the hopes that it will assist
in the continuance of the rift between BPP and US.  This car-
toon, or series of cartoons, will be similar in nature to those
formerly approved by the Bureau and will be forwarded to the
Bureau for evaluation and approval immediately upon their
completion.150
3. Creation of Intra- and Inter-Group Conflict
This brings us to the third level of COINTELPRO operations,
the FBI’s destruction of targeted organizations both by creating
internal dissension and by setting up groups to attack each other.
As reported by the Church Committee:
Approximately 28% of the Bureau’s COINTELPRO efforts
were designed to weaken groups by setting members against
each other, or to separate groups which might otherwise be
allies, and convert them into mutual enemies.  The techniques
used included anonymous mailings (reprints, Bureau-authored
articles and letters) to group members criticizing a leader or
an allied group; using informants to raise controversial issues;
forming a “notional”—a Bureau-run splinter group—to draw
away membership from the target organization; encouraging
hostility up to and including gang warfare, between rival
148 Thus, when Jamil al-Amin, formerly known as H. Rap Brown, was accused of
killing a deputy sheriff in 2000, he was not referred to as a Muslim community
leader, which he had been for twenty years, but as a former Black Panther, which he
had been for only a few months. See , e.g. , Police Hunt for Ex-Black Panther Ac-
cused of Killing, Wounding Cops , CHI. TRIB., Mar. 18, 2000 at 3; Lyda Longa, Of-
ficers Vow to Find Former Black Panther , ATLANTA J. & ATLANTA CONST., Mar. 18,
2000, at A1.
149 CHURCHILL & VANDER WALL, AGENTS, supra  note 79, at 42-43; some of the
leaflets and related FBI memoranda are reproduced in CHURCHILL & VANDER
WALL, COINTELPRO, supra  note 141, at 130-33.
150 Excerpt is reproduced in CHURCHILL & VANDER WALL, COINTELPRO,
supra  note 141, at 133.
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groups; and the “snitch jacket.”151
Thanks in part to such efforts, the Bureau managed to escalate
US-BPP tensions to the point that two US members, widely be-
lieved to be informants, shot and killed BPP members Jon Hug-
gins and Bunchy Carter at a meeting on the campus of the
University of California at Los Angeles in January 1969.152
Fabricated correspondence was also a favored tactic, as illus-
trated by Hoover’s authorization of an anonymous letter directed
to Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.—accompanied by a tape compiled
from bugs of his Washington, D.C. hotel room—suggesting that
he commit suicide to avoid the disgrace of the exposure of al-
leged sexual misconduct.153  Nearly one hundred instances of
fabricated correspondence between BPP leaders Huey Newton
and Eldridge Cleaver were instrumental in creating intra-party
violence and ensuring the 1971 split within the Party.154
Because of its success in actually infiltrating organizations, the
FBI was able to further disrupt their functioning by creating sus-
picions about legitimate leaders.  In a practice known as “bad-
jacketing” or “snitch-jacketing,” the Bureau spread rumors and
manufactured evidence that key members were informers or
were otherwise undermining the organization by subverting its
activities or stealing its funds.  This tactic succeeded not only in
discrediting many activists, but also resulted in the murders of
some who were falsely accused of betraying others within the
organization.155
4. Abuse of the Criminal Justice System
A fourth level of COINTELPRO operations involved the de-
liberate misuse of the criminal justice system.  Working with local
police departments, the FBI had activists repeatedly arrested, not
because it anticipated convictions, “but to simply harass, increase
paranoia, tie up activists in a series of pre-arraignment incarcera-
151 SENATE SELECT COMM., FINAL REPORT, supra  note 129, at 40. See infra  text
accompanying note 155 (discussing “snitch jackets”).
152 CHURCHILL & VANDER WALL, AGENTS, supra  note 79, at 42-43.
153 Id.  at 55, 57; SENATE SELECT COMM., FINAL REPORT, supra  note 129, at 82.
154 CHURCHILL & VANDER WALL, AGENTS, supra  note 79, at 40-42.
155 Id.  at 49-51 (noting FBI infiltrator Thomas E. Mosher’s explanation to the
Senate Internal Security Committee of how Black Panther Party leader Fred Bennet
was successfully bad-jacketed, leading to his assassination by Jimmie Carr, who was
in turn bad-jacketed and subsequently killed). See also SENATE SELECT COMM.,
FINAL REPORT, supra  note 129, at 46-49.
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tions and preliminary courtroom procedures, and deplete their
resources through the postings of numerous bail bonds (as well
as the retention of attorneys).”156  Using this tactic, the Revolu-
tionary Action Movement in Philadelphia was effectively de-
stroyed despite the fact that no criminal convictions were ever
obtained against members of this group.157  Similarly, the govern-
ment made 562 arrests in the wake of the 1973 occupation of
Wounded Knee by members of the American Indian Movement
(AIM).  Even though these massive arrests only resulted in a to-
tal of fifteen convictions, they succeeded in depleting AIM’s re-
sources and keeping its leaders tied up in court for years.158
Virtually all of the Bureau’s surveillance and infiltration re-
vealed that the targeted groups were engaging in entirely lawful
activity.159  Rather than turning its focus elsewhere, one of its re-
sponses was to place within groups agents provocateur who ad-
vocated violence or illegal activities which, if carried out, would
then be used as an excuse to crush the organizations.160  Another
response was to make it appear that the groups were engaging in
illegal conduct by obtaining convictions in questionable cases by
using fabricated evidence or perjured testimony and by explicitly
framing people for crimes they had not committed.
Prominent cases in which the FBI used perjured testimony and
falsified evidence to convict activists include that of New York
Black Panther Dhoruba bin Wahad (Richard Moore), whose
murder conviction was overturned in 1993 after he had spent
twenty years wrongfully incarcerated,161 and AIM activist Leo-
nard Peltier, who is still incarcerated after twenty-seven years,
156 CHURCHILL & VANDER WALL, AGENTS, supra  note 79, at 44.
157 Id.  at 47; see also  Airtel of Mar. 4, 1968, reproduced in CHURCHILL & VAN-
DER WALL, COINTELPRO, supra note 141, at 109 (stating that in response to
RAM activity in the summer of 1967, the Philadelphia FBI office “alerted local po-
lice, who then put RAM leaders under close scrutiny.  They were arrested on every
possible charge until they could no longer make bail.  As a result, RAM leaders
spent most of the summer in jail and no violence traceable to RAM took place.”).
158 CHURCHILL & VANDER WALL, AGENTS, supra  note 79, at 176, quoting Hear-
ings Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights , 97th Cong., 1st Session
on FBI Authorization, Mar. 19, 24, 25; Apr. 2 and 8, 1981; see generally JOHN WIL-
LIAM SAYER, GHOST DANCING THE LAW: THE WOUNDED KNEE TRIALS (1997).
159 See , e.g. , infra  text accompanying note 184 (noting the conclusions of the
judge in the SWP case).
160 See CHURCHILL & VANDER WALL, AGENTS, supra  note 79, at 219-33.
161 See generally  Wahad v. City of New York, 1999 WL 608772 (S.D.N.Y. 1999);
DHORUBA BIN WAHAD, MUMIA ABU-JAMAL, & ASSATA SHAKUR, STILL BLACK,
STILL STRONG: SURVIVORS OF THE U.S. WAR AGAINST BLACK REVOLU-TIONARIES
(1993); Churchill, To Disrupt , supra note 139, at 103-04.
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despite the acknowledgment that his conviction for the 1975
deaths of two FBI agents on the Pine Ridge Reservation was ob-
tained with the use of perjured testimony and falsified ballistics
evidence162 and despite worldwide recognition of his status as a
political prisoner.163
The best known case may be that of Los Angeles BPP leader
Geronimo ji Jaga (Pratt), who was the subject of constant surveil-
lance and numerous failed attempts to convict him of various
crimes.  Finally, in 1972, the government succeeded in convicting
him of the 1968 “tennis court” murder of a woman in Santa
Monica on the basis of the perjured testimony of an FBI inform-
ant, and despite the fact that the FBI, thanks to its surveillance,
knew that Pratt had been 350 miles away at a BPP meeting in
Oakland at the time of the murder.164
In these cases, which were by no means aberrational but rather
an explicit part of the government’s strategy to eliminate the
leadership of movements it did not sanction, the Department of
Justice—the nation’s highest law enforcement agency—was turn-
ing the criminal justice system on its head.  It was not enforcing
the law but was deliberately engaging in illegal practices, misus-
ing criminal laws and the courts to imprison activists, not because
they had engaged in criminal conduct but because of their politi-
cal beliefs, actions and associations.
5. Collaboration in Assaults and Assassinations
A fifth level of COINTELPRO operations involves the gov-
ernment’s participation in direct physical assaults and assassina-
162 See generally JIM MESSERSCHMIDT, THE TRIAL OF LEONARD PELTIER (1983);
MATTHIESSEN, supra  note 137; CHURCHILL & VANDER WALL, AGENTS, supra  note
79, at 294-96, 304-05, 319.
163 Leonard Peltier’s clemency petition to President Clinton was accompanied by
letters of support from, among many others, Amnesty International, Archbishop
Desmond Tutu, the Dalai Lama, the Archbishop of Canterbury, and a resolution of
the European Parliament (on file with author).  For a discussion of the heightened
post-September 11 repression of political prisoners, many of them COINTELPRO
victims, see J. Soffiyah Elijah, The Reality of Political Prisoners in the United States:
What September 11 Taught Us About Defending Them , 18 HARV. BLACKLETTER
L.J. 129 (2002).
164 See generally JACK OLSEN, LAST MAN STANDING: THE TRAGEDY AND TRI-
UMPH OF GERONIMO PRATT (2000); see also CHURCHILL & VANDER WALL,
AGENTS, supra  note 79, at 77-94.  After being wrongly imprisoned for twenty-seven
years, including eight years in solitary confinement, Pratt’s conviction was over-
turned, and he subsequently received out-of-court settlements of $1.75 million from
the FBI and $2.75 million from the City of Los Angeles. OLSEN, supra , at 487.
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tions.  This is, of course, the hardest area to document, but as
Churchill and Vander Wall note, while the Bureau has “almost
always used surrogates to perform such functions, [it] can repeat-
edly be demonstrated as having provided the basic intelligence,
logistics or other ingredients requisite to ‘successful’ operations
in this regard.”165
The most infamous of these is probably the 1969 murder of
Chicago Black Panthers Fred Hampton and Mark Clark.  At the
time, twenty-one year old Hampton was widely recognized as
one of the most charismatic leaders emerging in the black com-
munity and, despite his characterization by the government as a
“black nationalist,” it was his success in cross-racial coalition
building that the FBI found most threatening.166
The prominent role played by FBI informant William O’Neal,
who was by then in charge of security for the Chicago BPP chap-
ter, and the FBI’s collaboration with local police which
culminated in a pre-dawn assault on Hampton’s apartment is well
documented.167  Despite evidence that hundreds of shots were
fired into the apartment, killing Hampton and Clark and wound-
ing several others, including Hampton’s pregnant fiancee, with
only one shot fired in response, all government officials were
cleared of criminal charges.168  Nearly fifteen years later there
was a civil finding of a government conspiracy to deny the vic-
tims’ civil rights and a $1.85 million settlement,169 but the FBI
had long since accomplished its purpose of destroying the Black
Panther Party in Illinois.170
In the meantime, as part of its concerted program to destroy
the American Indian Movement, the FBI provided direct sup-
port to the self-proclaimed “Guardians of the Oglala Nation” or
165 CHURCHILL & VANDER WALL, AGENTS, supra  note 79, at 53.
166 See  Nikhil Pal Singh, The Black Panthers and the “Undeveloped Country” of
the Left , in THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY RECONSIDERED 57, 79-80 (Charles E.
Jones ed., 1998) (noting that Fred Hampton organized the original “rainbow
coalition”).
167 CHURCHILL & VANDER WALL, AGENTS, supra  note 79, at 64-77; Hampton v.
Hanrahan, 600 F.2d 600 (7th Cir. 1979), rev’d in part , 446 U.S. 754 (1980), remanded
to  499 F. Supp. 640 (1980) (holding that gross negligence in the raids resulting in the
deaths of Hampton and Clark was actionable).
168 For an excellent summary of this attack, see ROY WILKINS & RAMSEY CLARK,
SEARCH AND DESTROY: A REPORT BY THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO THE
BLACK PANTHERS AND THE POLICE (1973).
169 Hampton , 600 F.2d at 600.
170 CHURCHILL & VANDER WALL, AGENTS, supra  note 79, at 77; GOLDSTEIN,
supra  note 39, at xvi.
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“GOONS” on the Pine Ridge Reservation in South Dakota who
have been implicated in the “unsolved” deaths of at least seventy
individuals associated with AIM between 1972 and 1976.171  Par-
ticularly chilling is the fate of the family of John Trudell, AIM’s
last national chairman:
In February 1979, Trudell led a march in Washington, D.C. to
draw attention to the difficulties the Indians were having.  Al-
though he had received a warning against speaking out, he de-
livered an address from the steps of the FBI building on the
subject of the agency’s harassment of Indians . . . Less than 12
hours later, Trudell’s wife, Tina, his three children [ages five,
three and one], and his wife’s mother were burned alive in the
family home in Duck Valley, Nevada—the apparent work of
an arsonist.172
As noted above, what is at stake in allowing the government un-
restrained powers is not merely an abstract notion of First
Amendment freedoms but, in many cases, the very survival of
those who protest.
C. The Groups Targeted
Literally hundreds of organizations, most of them related only
by a desire to effect social or political change through constitu-
tionally protected means, were the targets of  various COINTEL-
PROs.  The Church Committee identified five overarching
categories of targets:  the Communist Party USA, the Socialist
Workers Party, “White Hate Groups,” “Black Nationalist Hate
Groups,” and the “New Left.”  As the Final Report noted, these
were “labels without meaning”173 as the categories included an
extremely wide range of often unrelated organizations.  Thus, all
of the predominantly black organizations targeted, including
Martin Luther King, Jr.’s Southern Christian Leadership Confer-
ence (SCLC) and numerous Black Student Unions, were “Black
Nationalist Hate Groups,” while the Communist Party USA
heading covered the National Committee to Abolish the House
171 See CHURCHILL & VANDER WALL, AGENTS, supra  note 79, at 164-97.  For the
FBI’s report on these deaths, see Report of the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
Minneapolis Division:  Accounting for Native American Deaths, Pine Ridge Indian
Reservation, South Dakota, Department of Justice (May 2000), available at  http://
www.freepeltier.org/fbi_pine_ridge_report.htm.  For a detailed response, see Ward
Churchill, The FBI’s “Accounting” of AIM Fatalities on Pine Ridge, 1973-1976 ,
available at  http://www.freepeltier.org/analysis_fbi.htm.
172 CHURCHILL & VANDER WALL, AGENTS, supra  note 79, at 361 (quoting Free-
dom , Sept. 1986, at 7).
173 SENATE SELECT COMM., FINAL REPORT, supra  note 129, at 4.
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Un-American Activities Committee and numerous civil rights
leaders.174  The “New Left,” which the Bureau could only define
as “more or less an attitude,” encompassed targets from the Stu-
dents for a Democratic Society (SDS) to anyone involved in pro-
testing the war in Vietnam.175  This section provides a few
examples of how these organizations were targeted.
1. Communist and Socialist Organizations
Throughout the 1940s and 1950s, COINTELPRO-type opera-
tions were directed almost exclusively at the Socialist Workers
Party (SWP), the Communist Party USA (CPUSA), and groups
believed to be affiliated with them.176  As previously noted,
groups identified as “communist” have been targeted by the gov-
ernment since the 1870s, and the FBI, or its predecessors, had
been trying to crush the CPUSA since its emergence in 1919.
The FBI’s first formal COINTELPRO, initiated in 1956, was di-
rected at the CPUSA, a lawfully constituted organization which
had not been shown to have engaged in any criminal activity.
The Bureau specifically instructed agents and infiltrators to gen-
erate “acrimonious debates,” “increase factionalism,” and gener-
ate “disillusionment and defection.”177  Apparently it was quite
successful.  Goldstein says:  “Although the precise results of FBI
efforts cannot be determined, between 1957 and 1959, what was
left of the CP was virtually destroyed by factional infighting.”178
Nonetheless, “[e]ven as the CP collapsed into a tiny sect of a
few thousand members, FBI COINTELPRO activities increased
and expanded”179 to the point where by the mid-1960s the FBI
was attempting to engineer the assassination of “key communist
leaders” by creating a conflict between the CP and organized
crime.180  The FBI undertook 1,388 separate actions against the
CPUSA between 1956 and 1971.181
In 1973, following public disclosure of COINTELPRO, the So-
cialist Workers Party and its youth organization, the Young So-
174 Id.  at 4-5.
175 See id.  at 23-27; see generally CHURCHILL & VANDER WALL, COINTEL-PRO,
supra  note 141, at 165-230; WILLIAM C. SULLIVAN, THE BUREAU: MY THIRTY
YEARS IN HOOVER’S FBI 147-61 (1979).
176 CHURCHILL & VANDER WALL, AGENTS, supra  note 79, at 37.
177 CHURCHILL & VANDER WALL, COINTELPRO, supra  note 141, at 39.
178 GOLDSTEIN, supra  note 39, at 408.
179 Id.
180 CHURCHILL & VANDER WALL, AGENTS, supra  note 79, at 44-46.
181 CHURCHILL & VANDER WALL, COINTELPRO, supra  note 141, at 47.
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cialist Alliance (YSA), sued the government for illegally
subjecting them to infiltration, disruption, and harassment in vio-
lation of their constitutional rights.  After fifteen years of litiga-
tion, the SWP and YSA were awarded $264,000 in damages.182
The suit documented FBI surveillance that began in 1936 and in-
cluded fifty-seven operations conducted by the FBI.  These in-
cluded poison-pen letters, malicious articles planted in the press,
instances of harassment and victimization, covert attempts to get
SWP members fired from their jobs, and efforts to disrupt collab-
oration between the SWP and civil rights and anti-Vietnam war
groups.
Judge Griesa’s opinion for the Southern District of New York
notes that between 1943 and 1963 the FBI illegally engaged in
20,000 days of wiretaps, 12,000 days of listening “bugs,” and 208
burglaries of office and homes, and that between 1960 and 1976 it
employed about 300 member informants (constituting, at any
given time, from two to eleven percent of the membership) and
1000 non-member informants.183  Griesa concludes:
Presumably the principal purpose of an FBI informant in a
domestic security investigation would be to gather information
about planned or actual espionage, violence, terrorism or
other illegal activities designed to subvert the governmental
structure of the United States.  In the case of the SWP, how-
ever, there is no evidence that any  FBI informant ever  re-
ported an instance of planned or actual espionage, violence,
terrorism or efforts to subvert the governmental structure of
the United States.  Over the course of approximately 30 years,
there is no indication that any informant ever observed any
violation of federal law or gave information leading to a single
arrest for any federal law violation.  What the informant activ-
ity yielded by way of information was thousands of reports re-
cording peaceful, lawful activity by the SWP and YSA.184
2. The Civil Rights Movement
By the early 1960s, J. Edgar Hoover began expanding
COINTELPRO operations to the civil rights movement, adding
Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. to the Atlanta field office’s pick-up
list of persons who would be interned under the Detention Act in
182 FBI ON TRIAL: THE VICTORY IN THE SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY SUIT
AGAINST GOVERNMENT SPYING 6-7 (Margaret Jayko ed., 1988).
183 Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney General of the United States, 642 F. Supp.
1357, 1379-80 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
184 Id.  at 1380 (emphasis added).
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the event of a national emergency.185  Despite the fact that the
Atlanta office had submitted a thirty-seven-page report confirm-
ing that neither King nor the SCLC were under any kind of com-
munist influence, Hoover rationalized the operation with the
assertion that King associated with “known Communists.”186
Shortly after King’s “I Have a Dream” speech, William Sulli-
van, who was responsible for COINTELPRO nationally, stated
in an internal FBI memorandum, “We must mark [King] . . . as
the most dangerous Negro in the future of this Nation from the
standpoint of communism, the Negro, and national security.
. . .”187  Acknowledging the FBI’s intent to use illegal methods,
he continued, “it may be unrealistic to limit [our actions against
King] to legalistic proofs that would stand up in court or before
Congressional Committees.”188  When the Bureau failed to con-
vince King to commit suicide, it stepped up the campaign to dis-
credit King and the SCLC, an effort that continued even after
King’s death.189  Numerous other civil rights organizations such
as the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), the
Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), the Mississippi Demo-
cratic Freedom Party, and various church and student organiza-
tions were similarly targeted.190
3. The Ku Klux Klan and “White Hate” Groups
Prior to the murders of three young northern “freedom riders”
in Mississippi in the summer of 1963, the FBI’s investigation of
“racial matters” focused not on the Ku Klux Klan or other white
supremacist organizations, but on subverting civil rights groups
and their relationships with predominantly white “new left” or-
ganizations.  The Bureau routinely fed information to police de-
partments enforcing the apartheid regime in the South, with full
knowledge that the police often transmitted the information di-
rectly to the Klan and related organizations.191  While the FBI
185 CHURCHILL & VANDER WALL, AGENTS, supra  note 79, at 54.
186 Id. ; see generally DAVID J. GARROW, THE FBI AND MARTIN LUTHER KING,
JR. (1981).
187 CHURCHILL & VANDER WALL, COINTELPRO, supra  note 141, at 96-97
(quoting a Memorandum from William C. Sullivan to Alan H. Belmont, Communist
Party, USA, Negro Question, IS-C , Aug. 30, 1963).
188 Id.  at 97.
189 Id.  at 97-98.
190 Id.  at 170-71.
191 Id.  at 166-70.  For an overview of this period in Mississippi history based on
documents finally released to the public in 1998, see generally YASUHIRO KATAGIRI,
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had informants in the Klan, it did not use the intelligence it gath-
ered to prevent violence against civil rights workers.
According to Kenneth O’Reilly, the FBI had been aware of
plans to attack two buses of freedom riders arriving in Alabama
in the spring of 1961 for weeks, but simply looked on, doing
nothing to intervene, when the first bus was destroyed and riders
on the second were attacked with bats, chains, and lead pipes.192
Indeed, the FBI had given the Birmingham police “details re-
garding the Freedom Riders’ schedule, knowing full well that at
least one law enforcement officer relayed everything to the
Klan.”193
An internal report indicates that the Bureau was aware that
during the Freedom Summer of 1963 at least thirty-five SNCC
workers were murdered and about 1000 arrested while engaging
in constitutionally protected activities, primarily a joint SNCC-
CORE voter registration drive intended to support the Missis-
sippi Freedom Democratic Party.194  Moreover, informants had
told the FBI that a Mississippi Klan leader had told his followers,
who included a significant number of law enforcement officers,
to “catch [activists] outside the law, then under Mississippi law
you can kill them.”195
Nonetheless, the Bureau did not act on reports that civil rights
activists James Cheney, Andrew Goodman, and Michael Sch-
werner—two of whom the FBI was monitoring as “subver-
sives”—were missing until the Justice Department came under
intense pressure as a result of widespread publicity about the dis-
appearances.196  Responding to the public outcry, President Lyn-
don Johnson himself began pressuring the Bureau to solve the
case, and the FBI eventually sent 258 agents to Mississippi.197
Even then, they found the bodies only after giving a Klan partici-
THE MISSISSIPPI STATE SOVEREIGNTY COMMISSION: CIVIL RIGHTS AND STATES’
RIGHTS (2001).
192 KENNETH O’REILLY, “RACIAL MATTERS”: THE FBI’S SECRET FILES ON
BLACK AMERICA, 1960-1972, at 84 (1989).
193 Id.  at 86.
194 CHURCHILL & VANDER WALL, COINTELPRO, supra  note 141, at 168 (citing
FBI monograph no. 1386, Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee  (FBI File No.
100-43190)).
195 Id.  (quoting a report of the Atlanta field office which noted the comment had
been made in early 1963).
196 Id.  at 168-69.
197 Id.
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pant $30,000 and immunity from prosecution.198  Twelve of the
participants in the murders went free and the remaining only
served short sentences for conspiracy to violate civil rights, not
for murder.199  What is particularly interesting is the FBI’s strat-
egy afterwards.  Their “sit by and watch” approach having been
nationally exposed, they seem to have developed a strategy to
control the Klan, but not necessarily to render it ineffective.200
4. The “New Left” and the Antiwar Movement
Between 1968 and 1971 “New Left” COINTELPROs targeted
a wide range of primarily white activist organizations, from Stu-
dents for a Democratic Society to the Institute for Policy Studies,
the Peace and Freedom Party, and “a broad range of anti-war,
anti-racist, student, GI, veteran, feminist, lesbian, gay, environ-
mental, Marxist, and anarchist groups, as well as the network of
food co-ops, health clinics, child care centers, schools, book-
stores, newspapers, community centers, street theaters, rock
groups, and communes that formed the infrastructure of the
counter-culture.”201
Given the government’s long history of suppressing anti-war
activists,202 it is not surprising that opponents of the war in Viet-
nam were a primary target.  A series of COINTELPRO opera-
tions were conducted with the aim of causing splits within anti-
war organizations and among coalitions of such organizations.203
College campuses, and even high schools, were a primary focus
of FBI operations, with informants placed in classrooms and stu-
dent organizations.204  Their tactics included false media reports,
198 Id.  at 169.
199 Id.
200 Sullivan states that in 1964 he instructed the special agent in charge in Missis-
sippi to merge separate Mississippi klans into one in order to “‘control it and if
necessary destroy it.’” SULLIVAN, supra  note 175, at 129-30.  By late 1965 the FBI
“operated nearly 2,000 informants, 20 percent of overall Klan and other white hate
group membership, including a grand dragon. . . .” O’REILLY, supra  note 192, at
217.  Nonetheless, from 1964-1970 Mississippi averaged 250 acts of White Hate vio-
lence per year. Id.  at 223.  During the period Sullivan claims FBI “control” of the
Mississippi klan, the Mississippi Knights alone bombed a synagogue and burned
twenty-six churches. WYN CRAIG WADE, THE FIERY CROSS:  THE KU KLUX KLAN
IN AMERICA 343 (1987).
201 GLICK, supra  note 135, at 12.
202 See supra  Parts II.B., III.
203 See BLACKSTOCK, supra  note 135, at 111-36 (reproducing a series of FBI mem-
oranda describing these operations).
204 See generally GLICK, supra  note 135.
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fabricated correspondence, the widespread use of informants and
infiltrators, and “snitch-jacketing.”  Government agents also ac-
tively subverted the logistics, such as the housing, transportation,
and meeting places of anti-war activities.205
5. “Black Nationalist” Organizations and the Black Panther
Party
The FBI has, of course, a long history of suppressing the ef-
forts of African Americans to obtain racial justice, from its de-
struction of Marcus Garvey’s UNIA to the undermining of civil
rights groups discussed above.206  Not surprisingly, the most in-
tense of its official COINTELPRO operations were directed at
“Black Nationalist” groups, a classification which appeared to in-
clude any predominantly African American organization.  Ac-
cording to a 1967 memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover, “The
purpose of this new counterintelligence endeavor is to expose,
disrupt, misdirect, discredit, or otherwise neutralize the activities
of black nationalists, hate-type organizations and groupings, their
leadership, spokesmen, membership, and supporters, and to
counter their propensity for violence and civil disorder.”207
One of the program’s explicitly stated goals was to “prevent
the rise of a ‘messiah’” who could unify the movement for Black
liberation.  According to Hoover, “Malcolm X might have been
such a ‘messiah;’ . . . Martin Luther King, Stokely Carmichael
and Elijah Muhammed all aspire to this position.”208  Another
primary goal was to “[p]revent militant black nationalist groups
and leaders from gaining respectability . . . .”209  Hoover in-
structed his agents:
You must discredit these groups and individuals to, first, the
responsible Negro community.  Second, they must be discred-
205 Id.
206 See supra  Parts III, IV.C.2.
207 Memorandum of Aug. 25, 1967, Counterintelligence Program; Black National-
ist-Hate Groups; Internal Security , reprinted in CHURCHILL & VANDER WALL,
COINTELPRO, supra  note 141, at 92.  In the world of actual counterintelligence
directed at foreign espionage, the sphere from which the Bureau was taking its tac-
tics, to “neutralize” is not just to render ineffective but to eliminate. See , e.g. , id.  at
102, 104 (reproducing FBI documents taking credit for the assassination of Malcolm
X and proposing to provoke the murder of comedian Dick Gregory).  On the origin
of “counterintelligence” activity as directed at foreign espionage, see UNGER, supra
note 80, at 96-118.
208 Airtel, supra  note 157, at 108-11.
209 Id.
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ited to the white community, both the responsible community
and to “liberals” who have vestiges of sympathy for militant
black nationalist [sic] simply because they are Negroes.  Third,
these groups must be discredited in the eyes of Negro radicals,
the followers of the movement.210
All predominantly Black activist organizations were targeted,
from King’s adamantly nonviolent SCLC to the Nation of Islam.
However, by 1968 the Bureau had decided that the Black Pan-
ther Party (BPP) was most likely to serve as an effective catalyst
for black liberation movements and declared the BPP to be “the
greatest [single] threat to the internal security of the country.”211
Field offices were instructed to submit proposals for “imaginative
and hard-hitting counterintelligence measures aimed at crippling
the BPP.”212  The Bureau has acknowledged conducting 295 offi-
cial COINTELPROs against Black activist organizations.  Of
these, 233 operations, most of which took place in 1969, directly
targeted the Black Panther Party.213  However, as Kenneth
O’Reilly says, “It is impossible to say how many COINTELPRO
actions the FBI implemented against the Panthers and other
targets simply by counting the incidents listed in the COINTEL-
PRO-Black Hate Group file.  The Bureau recorded COINTEL-
PRO-type actions in thousands of other files.”214  We do know
that ultimately:
[T]he assault left at least twenty-eight Panthers dead, scores of
others imprisoned after dubious convictions, and hundreds
more suffering permanent physical or psychological damage.
The Party was simultaneously infiltrated at every level by
agents provocateurs, all of them harnessed to the task of dis-
rupting its internal functioning.  Completing the package was a
torrent of disinformation planted in the media to discredit the
Panthers before the public, both personally and organization-
ally, thus isolating them from potential support.215
Ward Churchill concludes that “[a]lthough an entity bearing its
name remained in Oakland, California, for another decade . . .
the Black Panther Party in the sense that it was originally con-
210 Id.  at 110-11.
211 CHURCHILL & VANDER WALL, COINTELPRO, supra  note 141, at 123 (quot-
ing the New York Times , Sept. 8, 1968, reproduced in SENATE SELECT COMM., FI-
NAL REPORT, supra  note 129, at 187).
212 SENATE SELECT COMM., FINAL REPORT, supra  note 129, at 22.
213 Churchill, To Disrupt , supra  note 139, at 82.
214 O’REILLY, supra  note 192, at 291.
215 Churchill, To Disrupt , supra  note 139, at 78 (citations omitted).
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ceived was effectively destroyed by the end of 1971.”216  Among
the other things destroyed by COINTELPRO were the BPP
newspaper, schools, breakfast for children programs, sickle cell
anemia and other health care programs, and programs for free
clothing, shoes, housing, transportation to prisons and hospitals,
and child care.217  This further illustrates that it was not criminal
activity but challenges to the status quo that were perceived as
threats by the government.
6. The American Indian Movement
Soon after Hoover announced the termination of COINTEL-
PRO in 1971, the FBI was launching a massive operation against
American Indian organizations which moved from “counterintel-
ligence” actions to the use of tactics which are probably more
accurately described as “counterinsurgency warfare.”  Their pri-
mary target was the American Indian Movement (AIM),
founded in Minneapolis in 1968.  In many respects, AIM emu-
lated the Black Panther Party with street patrols intended to
counter police brutality by “policing the police” and the estab-
lishment of alternative schools and media, legal and health clin-
ics, free food programs, and services to assist with housing and
employment.218  More threatening to the federal government,
however, was AIM’s emerging focus on reasserting American In-
dian sovereignty and its success in linking the poverty and de-
spair of Indian communities directly to federal policies.219
AIM leaders organized the 1972 “Trail of Broken Treaties”
march across the country to Washington, D.C., where they occu-
pied the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) office and obtained clas-
sified documents which showed, among other things, that
American Indians were receiving only about ten percent of the
market value of mineral and land leases—and even that money
216 Id.
217 See  Charles E. Jones & Judson L. Jeffries, Don’t Believe the Hype:  Debunking
the Panther Mythology , in THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY RECONSIDERED 25, 30
(Charles E. Jones ed., 1998).  Positions and perspectives articulated by the BPP are
compiled in THE BLACK PANTHERS SPEAK (Philip S. Foner ed., 1970), and excellent
collections of contemporary analyses can be found in LIBERATION, IMAGINATION
AND THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY, supra  note 139 and Jones & Jeffries, supra .
218 Ward Churchill, Civil Rights, Red Power and the FBI:  Rise and Repression of
the American Indian Movement  (forthcoming) (copy on file with author) [hereinaf-
ter Civil Rights).
219 See generally REX WEYLER, BLOOD OF THE LAND: THE GOVERNMENT AND
CORPORATE WAR AGAINST THE AMERICAN INDIAN MOVEMENT (1984).
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was not accounted for—and uncovering a secret Indian Health
Services program which had resulted in the sterilization of forty
percent of American Indian women of childbearing age.220
Many of the subsequent FBI operations centered on the Pine
Ridge Reservation, where federal agents had installed a tribal
president who was willing to turn over a large, mineral-rich por-
tion of the reservation to the government.221  There, in 1973, the
FBI led a paramilitary invasion against AIM activists gathered
for a symbolic protest at Wounded Knee, the site of the 1890
massacre.222  During their 71-day siege the government deployed
over 100 FBI agents, nearly 300 federal marshals, 250 BIA po-
lice, Army warfare experts, and local vigilantes known as the
GOONS (Guardians of the Oglala Nation).223  In their attempt
to remove the activists, government forces fired approximately
500,000 rounds of ammunition into the area.224  The government
followed up with the hundreds of bogus criminal charges in-
tended to keep AIM leaders tied up in court and to deplete the
organization’s funds.225
From 1973 to 1976 the GOONS, often using arms supplied
them by the FBI,226 murdered at least sixty-nine AIM members
and supporters on the Pine Ridge Reservation and assaulted an-
other 340.  The FBI, which exercised criminal jurisdiction on the
reservation, was too “short of manpower” to investigate these
murders.227  In 1975 it was revealed that AIM’s national security
chief, Doug Durham, was an undercover FBI operative.  Among
other things, Durham had been AIM’s liaison with the Wounded
Knee legal defense team and had authored the AIM documents
consistently cited by the FBI to demonstrate the group’s alleged
tendencies toward violence.228
220 Id. See also  Ward Churchill, The Bloody Wake of Alcatraz:  Political Repres-
sion of the American Indian Movement During the 1970s , in AMERICAN INDIAN AC-
TIVISM: ALCATRAZ TO THE LONGEST WALK 242-84 (Troy Johnson et al., eds. 1997).
The effort to force the government to account for at least $10 billion of “missing”
Indian trust fund monies continues to this day. See  Cobell v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1081
(D.C. Cir. 2001) (holding that the Interior Dept. had breached its fiduciary duty and
must conduct an accurate accounting).
221 CHURCHILL & VANDER WALL, AGENTS, supra  note 79, at 135-41.
222 Id.  at 141-170.
223 See  Churchill, Civil Rights , supra  note 218; GLICK, supra  note 135, at 22.
224 See  Churchill, Civil Rights , supra note 218.
225 See supra  text accompanying note 158. See generally SAYER, supra  note 158.
226 See  Churchill, Civil Rights, supra  note 218.
227 Id.
228 See GLICK, supra  note 135, at 22.
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On June 23, 1975, the Church Committee announced that it
would hold hearings on the FBI operations targeting the Ameri-
can Indian Movement.  Three days later, two FBI agents were
killed in a firefight on Pine Ridge,229 triggering, in the words of
the Chair of the U.S. Civil Rights Commission, “a full-scale mili-
tary-type invasion of the reservation”230 and allowing the Church
Committee to “postpone” the hearings indefinitely.
D. Assessing COINTELPRO:  Is It Over?
Even the Church Committee’s carefully worded Final Report
acknowledged:
[I]n the course of COINTELPRO’s fifteen-year history, a
number of individual actions may have violated specific crimi-
nal statutes; a number of individual actions involved risk of
serious bodily injury or death to the targets . . . ; and a number
of actions, while not illegal or dangerous, can only be de-
scribed as “abhorrent in a free society.”231
Given the massive documentation of illegal and unconstitutional
activities conducted by the United States’ highest law enforce-
ment agency against its own citizens, the paucity of legal analysis
of these activities is quite stunning.232  There is a tendency to dis-
miss the COINTELPRO era as “an awkward period in the his-
tory of the FBI”233 rather than recognizing, as the Church
Committee did, that it was, in fact, a war  against social and politi-
cal dissent in the United States.234
By 1989, a federal district court was already discounting
COINTELPRO activities as “[r]elatively ancient governmental
229 Bob Robideaux, Dino Butler and Leonard Peltier were charged with the
agents’ deaths.  (No one has ever been charged with the death of AIM activist Joe
Killsright Stuntz).  After a jury acquitted Butler and Robideaux, Peltier was extra-
dited from Canada on the basis of perjured affidavits, his case transferred to a judge
more sympathetic to the government, and he was convicted on the basis of perjured
testimony and falsified evidence. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, PROPOSAL FOR A
COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO THE EFFECT OF DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE ACTIVI-
TIES ON CRIMINAL TRIALS IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 41-46 (1981); see
generally MESSERSCHMIDT, supra  note 162; MATTHIESSEN, supra  note 137.
230 BRUCE JOHANSEN & ROBERTO MAESTAS, WASI’CHU: THE CONTINUING IN-
DIAN WARS 95-96 (1979).
231 SENATE SELECT COMM., FINAL REPORT, supra  note 129, at 7-8.
232 A September 2002 Westlaw search of law review articles written since 1975
referencing “COINTELPRO” yielded seventy-two articles.  The vast majority men-
tioned it only in passing; a few discussed COINTELPROs against particular organi-
zations; and none discussed the overall phenomenon in any detail.
233 Campbell v. Dep’t of Justice, 164 F.3d 20, 26 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
234 See supra  text accompanying note 134.
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misconduct” irrelevant to indictments being brought against
white activists in the “Resistance Conspiracy” case.235  Can we
safely relegate this era to history, perhaps acknowledging that, as
Senator Church put it, it was “one of the sordid episodes in the
history of American law enforcement,”236 but accepting it as an
aberration generated by the FBI’s zeal for protecting the national
security?  There are a number of reasons why such an approach,
while perhaps comforting to some, is not warranted.
First, we must look at the “excesses” of the COINTELPRO
era in light of the earlier history of the FBI and its predecessor
organizations.  While the earlier efforts to suppress political dis-
sent were not nearly as well funded or efficiently organized, this
country has a consistent history of using its police powers—fed-
eral, state, local and private—not to enforce the law and uphold
the Constitution, but to crush what are perceived as threats to
the status quo.  The purposes of COINTELPRO, as articulated
by the Church Committee, illustrate that it was the logical exten-
sion of this history:
Protecting national security and preventing violence are the
purposes advanced by the Bureau for COINTELPRO.  There
is another purpose for COINTELPRO which is not explicit
but which offers the only explanation for those actions which
had no conceivable rational relationship to either national se-
curity or violent activity.  The unexpressed major premise . . .
is that the Bureau has a role in maintaining the existing social
order, and that its efforts should be aimed toward combating
those who threaten that order.237
Second, we must remember that information about
COINTELPRO was only made available to the American public
because a group of citizens burglarized the FBI’s Media, Penn-
sylvania office and stole files which were subsequently published
in the press—an activity that would today probably be classified
235 United States v. Whitehorn, 710 F. Supp. 803, 813 (D.D.C. 1989), rev’d on
other grounds sub. nom.  United States v. Rosenberg, 888 F.2d 1406 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
For a description of this case, known as the “Resistance Conspiracy,” see CHURC-
HILL & VANDER WALL, COINTELPRO, supra  note 141, at 312-15.  Three of the
activists convicted for an alleged conspiracy to bomb government buildings, Laura
Whitehorn, Linda Evans and Susan Rosenberg, were granted clemency by President
Clinton in January 2001 and released after spending fifteen to twenty years in prison.
Amy Goldstein & Susan Schmidt, Clinton’s Last-Day Clemency Benefits 176 , WASH.
POST, Jan. 21, 2001, at A1.
236 CHURCHILL & VANDER WALL, AGENTS, supra  note 79, at 62.
237 SENATE SELECT COMM., FINAL REPORT, supra  note 129, at 6-7.
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as “domestic terrorism” under the 2001 Act238—and because the
Watergate scandal, not the crushing of the political movements in
question, spurred the Senate to convene the Church Committee
hearings.239  Almost all of the additional documentation of
COINTELPRO abuses has been obtained by piecing together
censored files released under the Freedom of Information Act,240
an avenue dramatically curtailed by Attorney General Ashcroft
in October 2001.241  There is no reliable way for the American
public to know what programs are continuing or may be insti-
tuted in the future.
Third, what we do know about the FBI’s activities from 1956 to
1976, generally believed to be the height of COINTELPRO-type
operations, is far from complete.  The Church Committee’s find-
ings are based on the depositions of select Bureau agents and
targets, and the review of only about 20,000 of the millions of
pages of documents generated by the Bureau.242  It could not, of
course, review files that were withheld or destroyed or opera-
tions that were not documented.243  More significantly, the
Church Committee “temporarily” suspended its investigation
before reaching scheduled hearings on some of the FBI’s most
intense operations, notably those targeting the American Indian
Movement and the movements for Puerto Rican independence,
just as the repression of these groups was reaching its zenith.244
238 See infra  text accompanying notes 345-47.
239 Noam Chomsky, Introduction  to BLACKSTOCK, supra  note 135.
240 See generally CHURCHILL & VANDER WALL, COINTELPRO, supra  note 141.
There are significant limitations on what the government is obliged to disclose under
FOIA, but it is worth noting in addition that the D.C. Circuit has said that docu-
ments can be exempted from disclosure as investigatory records even if they were
unlawfully obtained.  Pratt v. Webster, 673 F.2d 408 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
241 See  John Ashcroft, Memorandum for Heads of All Federal Departments and
Agencies (Oct. 12, 2001), available at  http://www.usdoj.gov/04foia/011012.htm; see
also  Steven L. Hensen, The President’s Papers Are the People’s Business , WASH.
POST, Dec. 16, 2001, at B1.
242 SENATE SELECT COMM., FINAL REPORT, supra  note 129.
243 The FBI withheld information from Congress about its involvement in the
1969 assassinations of Fred Hampton and Mark Clark, and its failure to disclose
exculpatory evidence in the murder trials of Black Panther leaders Geronimo Pratt
and Dhoruba bin Wahad (Richard Moore). CHURCHILL & VANDER WALL,
COINTELPRO, supra  note 141, at 303.  Both Pratt and bin Wahad have since been
released—after being incarcerated for twenty-seven and nineteen years, respec-
tively—on the basis of evidence that they were framed. See supra  text accompany-
ing notes 161, 164.
244 CHURCHILL & VANDER WALL, AGENTS, supra  note 79, at 119-34, 366-70; see
also supra  Part IV.C.5-6.
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Twenty-six years later the hearings have not been resumed.245
Fourth, what has been done about the abuses that were ex-
posed?  One of the fundamental principles of American law, and
of the rule of law more generally, is that there is a remedy for
legally acknowledged wrongs.  Despite the thousands of in-
stances of illegal conduct on the part of the government that
were documented by both Senate and House committees, no
changes were made in the law and no government official has
spent a day in jail as a result.246  A handful of victims or their
surviving families have managed to obtain civil judgments or set-
tlements for damages, but these cases are by far the exception.247
No one disputes that governmental agencies at the highest
level engaged in long-term, systematic and deliberate violation of
the laws and the Constitution.  Yet the legislature which enacts
the laws, the executive which is charged by the Constitution with
“faithfully Executing the laws,” and the judiciary whose responsi-
bility it is to see that the laws are enforced have all looked the
other way and, by doing so, have implicitly sanctioned this under-
mining of the rule of law.  All of this confirms the accuracy of
FBI Director Kelley’s testimony to the Church Committee that
“the FBI employees involved in these programs did what they
felt was expected of them by the President, the Attorney Gen-
245 In the summer of 2001, Congresswoman Cynthia McKinney (D-Ga.) had be-
gun introducing legislation to reopen investigations into COINTELPRO and related
governmental misconduct, but the events of September 11 ensured that the legisla-
tion would not be considered (draft legislation on file with author).
246 The only two officials convicted of COINTELPRO-related wrongdoing were
pardoned by President Reagan before they had even exhausted their appeals. See
infra  text accompanying note 273.
247 Individual damages were recovered by Fred Hampton’s family and by Gero-
nimo Pratt and Dhoruba bin Wahad, see supra  text accompanying notes 161, 164.
The SWP recovered nominal damages on behalf of the organization, see supra  text
accompanying note 182.  In Hobson v. Brennan , 646 F. Supp. 884 (D.D.C. 1986), the
court awarded $29,000 in compensatory damages and allowed punitive damages for
persons targeted by anti-war and civil rights COINTELPROs.
But more commonly suits have been unsuccessful. See Smith v. Black Panther
Party, 458 U.S. 1118 (1982) (mem. opin. dismissing BPP complaint); Bissonette v.
Haig, 776 F.2d 1384 (8th Cir. 1985) (holding that claim by residents of Pine Ridge
Reservation for unlawful seizure and confinement by military and federal officials
was insufficient to state cause of action); Obadele v. Kelley, 1988 WL 40282, at *4,
*16 (D.D.C. Apr. 26, 1988) (dismissing claims brought by Republic of New Afrika
for being time-barred, lacking jurisdiction, failing to state a claim, and/or being re-
lated to a criminal conviction); United Klans of America v. McGovern, 621 F.2d 152
(5th Cir. 1980) (suit for damages for COINTELPRO operations barred by statute of
limitations).
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eral, the Congress, and the people of the United States.”248
Fifth, despite the barriers to public access to such information,
there is on-going evidence that COINTELPRO-type operations
continue.  On April 27, 1971, in response to the release of classi-
fied information obtained in a break-in of the Media, Penn-
sylvania, FBI office, Hoover officially terminated all
COINTELPROs for “security reasons.”249  The FBI “termina-
tion” memo provided, however, that “[i]n exceptional circum-
stances where it is considered counter-intelligence action is
warranted, recommendations should be submitted to the Bureau
under the individual case caption to which it pertains.”250
Despite the Bureau’s initial contention that there was no post-
1971 COINTELPRO activity, the Church Committee docu-
mented several post-1971 COINTELPRO-type operations,251
and noted that it had not been able to determine with any greater
precision the extent to which COINTELPRO may be continuing,
because any proposals to initiate COINTELPRO-type action
would be filed under the individual case caption.  The Bureau by
then had over 500,000 case files, and each one would have to be
searched.252  In fact, the number of illegal bugs and wiretaps uti-
lized by the Bureau in the three years after 1971 increased
significantly.253
In the meantime, evidence of on-going operations continues to
surface.  During the 1980s the FBI and CIA used classic
COINTELPRO tactics against organizations opposed to U.S.
policy in Latin America.  Operating under classified “Foreign In-
telligence/Terrorism” guidelines promulgated by the Reagan ad-
ministration,254 the government targeted the nonviolent
Committee In Solidarity with the People of El Salvador
248 SENATE SELECT COMM., FINAL REPORT, supra  note 129, at 14.
249 Id.  at 3 n.1.
250 Id.  at 13. See also  Fed. Election Comm’n v. Hall-Tyner Election Campaign
Comm’n, 678 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1982) (holding that the CPUSA did not have to
disclose contributors’ names as that would have a chilling effect on them).  The court
noted that even though the CPUSA COINTELPRO was terminated in 1971, “the
record in this case includes an affidavit by the Assistant Director of the Intelligence
Division of the FBI stating that the Communist Party of the United States remains
under active investigation by the FBI.” Id.  at 423.
251 SENATE SELECT COMM., FINAL REPORT, supra  note 129, at 13-14, noting three
operations it had uncovered and the subsequent disclosure of five additional ones.
252 Id.  at 13.
253 CHURCHILL & VANDER WALL, COINTELPRO, supra  note 141, at 304.
254 FBI ON TRIAL, supra  note 182, at 15.
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(CISPES) and groups involved in the “Sanctuary” movement.255
When their own field reports consistently confirmed that the ac-
tivities of CISPES and other Latin America solidarity organiza-
tions were “legitimate” and “respectable,” the FBI took the
position that CISPES’s overt activities were “designed to cover a
sinister covert  program of which most CISPES members were
unaware,” and that it must be a “front group” for more danger-
ous organizations.256  Using this rationale, the FBI extended its
operations to  encompass hundreds of other groups, including
Amnesty International, Clergy and Laity Concerned, the U.S.
Catholic Conference and the Maryknoll Sisters, utilizing its stan-
dard tactics of infiltrators and agents provocateur, disinforma-
tion, black bag jobs, telephone monitoring, and conspicuous
surveillance designed to induce paranoia.257  Ultimately, in this
context
the FBI gathered information on the political activities of ap-
proximately 2,375 individuals and 1,330 organizations, and ini-
tiated 178 related investigations that appear to have been
based on political ideology rather than on suspicion of crimi-
nal activity.  Yet this massive government intrusion into the
lives of thousands of lawful political activists failed to yield a
single criminal charge, let alone a criminal conviction.258
Using the rubric of “counter-terrorism” rather than “anti-com-
munism,” the FBI has continued to conduct numerous opera-
tions against anti-war and anti-nuclear groups such as the pacifist
organization Silo Plowshares;259 environmental activists such as
Earth First!;260 supporters of the Puerto Rican independence
movement, including the coordinator of the National Lawyers
Guild’s anti-repression task force;261 and perhaps black elected
255 On the repression of the Sanctuary movement, see generally Michael McCon-
nell & Renny Golden, The Sanctuary Movement , in FREEDOM AT RISK, supra  note
58, at 301-14.
256 CHURCHILL & VANDER WALL, AGENTS, supra  note 79, at 373-74.
257 CHURCHILL & VANDER WALL, COINTELPRO, supra  note 141, at 306;
CHURCHILL & VANDER WALL, AGENTS, supra  note 79, at 370-76.
258 CHANG, supra  note 25, at 36; see also  Don Edwards, Reordering the Priorities
of the FBI in Light of the End of the Cold War , 65 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 59 (1991).
259 CHURCHILL & VANDER WALL, COINTELPRO, supra  note 141, at 307.
260 Brian Glick, Preface  to The Face of COINTELPRO , in CHURCHILL & VAN-
DER WALL, COINTELPRO supra  note 141, at xiv (noting that Earth First! leaders
were convicted on the basis of the testimony of an FBI infiltrator) [hereinafter
Glick, Preface].
261 Id.  at xv.
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officials in general.262  As Brian Glick states:
The targets [of ongoing domestic covert action] . . . include
virtually all who fight for peace and social justice in the United
States—from AIM, Puerto Rican independentistas  and the
Coalition for a New South, to environmentalists, pacifists,
trade unionists, homeless and seniors, feminists, gay and les-
bian activists, radical clergy and teachers, publishers of dissi-
dent literature, prison reformers, progressive attorneys, civil
rights and anti-poverty workers, and on and on.263
Finally, the best evidence that COINTELPRO-type opera-
tions, and the more general repression of political dissent that
they represent, cannot be relegated to history may be the consis-
tent efforts of the executive branch to roll back the minimal re-
forms mandated by Congress in the wake of the Church
Committee investigations, to further shield their activities from
public scrutiny, and to legalize many of the tactics routinely em-
ployed by the FBI in its efforts to suppress dissent, before, during





The American people need to be assured that never again will
an agency of the government be permitted to conduct a secret
war against those citizens it considers threats to the estab-
lished order.  Only a combination of legislative prohibition
and Departmental control can guarantee that COINTELPRO
will not happen again.
—Church Committee, Final Report265
262 See generally  Bernard P. Haggerty, “Fruhmenschen”: German for COINTEL-
PRO , 1 HOW. SCROLL 36, 38 (1993) (detailing campaigns of harassment of black
elected officials).
263 Glick, Preface, supra  note 260, at xiv.
264 For a summary of how COINTELPRO-type activities have been incorporated
into “routine” law enforcement practice, and an analysis which extends to the more
recent FBI operations in Ruby Ridge, Tennessee and Waco, Texas, see Ward Churc-
hill, Preface to the Second Edition, in CHURCHILL & VANDER WALL, COINTEL-
PRO, supra  note 141 at xxiii-lxxxviii. See also TONY POVEDA, LAWLESSNESS AND
REFORM: THE FBI IN TRANSITION 167-82 (1990) (concluding that the “new,” i.e.,
post-Hoover, FBI is less autonomous but potentially more dangerous because its
priorities are more aligned with those of the incumbent administration, and it has
vastly increased technological capacities).
265 SENATE SELECT COMM., FINAL REPORT, supra  note 129, at 77.
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Despite the Church Committee’s conclusion that dozens of
governmental law enforcement and intelligence agencies had en-
gaged in massive abuses of the constitutional rights of U.S. citi-
zens and residents, very little happened as a result.  The hearings
were suspended in mid-stream and never reopened, no individu-
als were sent to prison on criminal charges, no laws were passed
proscribing such activities, and no provision was made to rectify
on-going wrongs or to compensate the victims.  The Carter ad-
ministration imposed some very limited internal constraints on
“domestic security” investigations but, as we will see, even these
were soon rolled back.
As a result of the Church Committee’s findings, as well as in-
vestigations by a select committee in the House of Representa-
tives and a General Accounting Office review of FBI domestic
intelligence policies requested by the House Judiciary Commit-
tee,266 the Department of Justice issued its first set of public
guidelines for FBI domestic security investigations in 1976.
Known as the “Levi guidelines,” after then-Attorney General
Edward Levi, they prohibited investigations or operations de-
signed to disrupt organizations based solely on unpopular
speech.267  They also limited the basis on which investigations
would be authorized.
Under the Levi guidelines, the FBI could initiate a “prelimi-
nary” investigation on the basis of any allegation or information
that a group or individual “may be engaged in [unlawful] activi-
ties” which “involve or will involve the use of force or violence.”
These were authorized to determine whether the factual basis ex-
isted for launching a “full” investigation, and the Bureau was to
be limited to public, law enforcement, or pre-existing sources of
information.  More intrusive “limited” investigations, including
physical surveillance and personal interviews were authorized if
the preliminary investigation proved inadequate to determine
whether a full investigation was warranted.  “Full” investigations
were authorized on the—still very broad—basis of “specific and
articulable facts giving reason to believe that an individual or a
group is or may be engaged in [unlawful] activities which involve
the use of force or violence.”268  Reportedly, the number of do-
266 Stone, supra  note 82, at 275.
267 William C. Banks & M.E. Bowman, Executive Authority for National Security
Surveillance , 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 69 (2000).
268 Stone, supra  note 82, at 276.
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mestic security investigations being conducted by the FBI
dropped from 4868 in March 1976 to 26 in December 1981.269
Even this requirement of a very tentative connection to crimi-
nal activity was resisted.  Senator Denton, chair of the Senate Ju-
diciary Committee’s Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism,
insisted that “the support groups that produce propaganda, dis-
information, or ‘legal assistance’ may be even more dangerous
than those who actually throw the bombs.”270  Another member
of the subcommittee, Senator East, said that the “conduct of sub-
version itself consists in large measure in the utilization of legal
activities to undermine . . . legally established institutions.”271
The scant protection provided by the Levi guidelines did not
last long.  In 1981, President Ronald Reagan issued Executive
Order (EO) 12333 reauthorizing many of the techniques prohib-
ited by the guidelines.  In 1983, Reagan issued EO 12345 which
claimed to give the Bureau and other intelligence agencies “legal
authority” to withhold information about their use of counter-
intelligence methods.272  In the meantime, he pardoned W. Mark
Felt and Edward S. Miller, the only FBI officials ever convicted
on COINTELPRO-related charges, before they spent a day in
jail or even had to bother appealing their sentences.273
By 1982, FBI Director William Webster had declared that the
Levi guidelines were “no longer adequate to guide us in dealing
with the kinds of terrorist groups that we are confronted with
today,”274 and they were replaced in 1983 by Attorney General
William French Smith.  The new “Smith guidelines” eliminated
the “preliminary” and “limited” stages altogether and removed
the “specific and articulable facts” requirement from full investi-
gations.  The new standard authorized investigations whenever
“facts or circumstances reasonably indicate that two or more per-
sons are engaged in an enterprise for the purpose of furthering
political or social goals wholly or in part through activities that
involve force or violence.”275  The Smith guidelines extended the
269 Id.  at 277.
270 Id.  (citing Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Security and Terrorism of the
Comm. of the Judiciary of the United States Senate on The Domestic Security Investi-
gation Guidelines , 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1982)) [hereinafter Hearings].
271 Id.  (citing Hearings , supra  note 270 at 35-41).
272 CHURCHILL & VANDER WALL, COINTELPRO, supra  note 141, at xlviii.
273 Id.  at il.
274 Stone, supra  note 82, at 278.
275 Id.  at 278-79.
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“enterprise concept” from investigations of organized crime to
groups that do not engage in criminal activity but are believed to
“knowingly support” the criminal objectives of other groups and
allowed the Bureau to continue to monitor groups that were
inactive.
In 1969, the Supreme Court had restricted Schenck  and Den-
nis , the cases upholding convictions under the Smith Act,276 by
stating in Brandenburg v. Ohio  that the First Amendment did
not allow the government to “forbid or proscribe advocacy of the
use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is
directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is
likely to incite or produce such action.”277  However, the Smith
guidelines turned this standard upside down by declaring that in-
vestigations of groups that advocated criminal activity were war-
ranted “unless it is apparent . . . that there is no prospect of
harm.”278  According to Attorney General Smith, the targets’
constitutional rights were protected by the guidelines’ caveat that
investigations could not be “based solely  on activities protected
by the First Amendment.”279
Further illustration of the fact that the measures of the
COINTELPRO era were not aberrational but part of a more
general effort to suppress political dissent can be seen in the im-
plementation of the 1984 Bail Reform Act,280 which dramatically
expanded the use of preventive detention.  While purportedly
designed to keep “drug kingpins, violent offenders and other ob-
vious threats to the community” incarcerated while awaiting trial,
it “provid[ed] the FBI with a weapon far superior to the strategy
of pretext arrests” in detaining political targets such as the Pu-
erto Rican independentistas , Resistance Conspiracy defendants,
and IRA asylum seekers.281
In the meantime, Congress had passed the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act (FISA) in 1978,282 which established a secret
276 See supra  text accompanying notes 117-19.
277 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
278 Stone, supra  note 82, at 279.
279 Id.  at 281 (emphasis added).  The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, in an
opinion written by Judge Richard Posner, affirmed this interpretation, declaring in
Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago , 742 F.2d 1007, 1015-17 (7th Cir.
1984), that Brandenburg  applied only to criminal punishment and not to investiga-
tions.  For a critique of this opinion, see Stone, supra  note 82, at 283-86.
280 Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-3150, 3156.
281 CHURCHILL & VANDER WALL, COINTELPRO, supra  note 141, at il.
282 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, Pub. L. No. 95-511; 92 Stat. 1783 (1978)
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Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) composed of
seven federal appellate court judges serving rotating terms whose
purpose was to review warrants for surveillance in cases targeting
a “foreign power” or the “agent of a foreign power.”  FISA sig-
nificantly reduced the showing required for warrants, initially for
surveillance and later for physical searches as well.283  The safe-
guard was presumably that these warrants were to be issued only
in cases primarily involving foreign intelligence, and subject to
the limitation that no U.S. person, meaning a citizen or perma-
nent resident, could be targeted “solely on the basis of activities
protected by the First Amendment.”284  Despite the passage of
this Act, the executive branch has consistently maintained that,
as a constitutional matter, the President does not need congres-
sional or judicial approval to engage in warrantless searches.285
Following the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center, the
Clinton administration considered a proposal to rewrite the
Smith guidelines to permit the FBI to infiltrate domestic groups
without any evidence that the targeted organization was planning
to commit criminal acts.286  Instead, in 1995 FBI Director Louis
Freeh and Deputy Attorney General Jamie Gorelick told the
House Judiciary Committee Subcommittee on Crime that the ad-
ministration had decided to “reinterpret” the guidelines to allow
wide-ranging investigations of “domestic terrorism” groups if
they “advocated violence or force with respect to achieving any
political or social objectives.”  Instead of requiring a finding of an
“imminent violation” of law, an investigation would be author-
ized if the Bureau “detected any potential conduct” that “might
violate federal law,”287 clearly disregarding the Smith guidelines’
requirement that the government at least take into consideration
the magnitude of the threat, its likelihood and immediacy, and
(codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1811 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)), amended
by  Act of Dec. 3, 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-120, 113 Stat. 1606 (1999).
283 See  Americo R. Cinquegrana, The Walls (and Wires) Have Ears:  The Back-
ground and First Ten Years of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 , 137
U. PA. L. REV. 793 (1989) (describing history and early use of FISA); Daniel J.
Malooly, Physical Searches Under FISA:  A Constitutional Analysis , 35 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 411, 421-23 (1998) (suggesting changes which would help protect Fourth
Amendment rights in FISA searches).
284 50 U.S.C. § 1805 (a)(3)(A).
285 Banks & Bowman, supra  note 267, at 19-31, 49-66, 90-92.
286 Id.  at 107.
287 Id.  at 107-08.
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the danger to individual freedoms posed by the investigation.288
The past decade has seen a dramatic increase in the legaliza-
tion of many of the tactics used by the FBI and other intelligence
agencies during the COINTELPRO era.  In 1994, Congress
passed the Omnibus Crime Bill289 which gave the FBI an addi-
tional $25 million per year for its “counterterrorism” budget and
another $25 million per year for training state and local SWAT
teams, created an Economic Terrorism Task Force and author-
ized the death penalty for numerous new categories of “terrorist
activity.”290  Even though the FBI had reported only two inci-
dents of international terrorism in the United States between
1984 and 1996, Congress nonetheless passed the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) whose
“sweeping provisions served to license almost the full range of
repressive techniques which had been quietly continued after
COINTELPRO was supposedly terminated.”291  The Act defines
“national security” as encompassing “the national defense, for-
eign relations, or economic interests of the United States” and
gives the secretary of state broad authority to designate groups as
“engaging in terrorist activity” if they threaten “the security of
United States nationals or the national security of the United
States.”292  Groups so designated can seek judicial review, but
the government can prevent them from seeing the evidence by
presenting it to the judge in camera , and the judge is to review
the decision under the highly deferential “arbitrary and capri-
cious” standard of the Administrative Procedure Act.293
Under the 1996 Act, it is a felony to provide any form of mate-
rial support to designated organizations even if the support goes
288 Id.  at 108.
289 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103-322,
108 Stat. 1796 (1994) (amending Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968).
290 CHURCHILL & VANDER WALL, COINTELPRO, supra  note 141, at l (citing 18
U.S.C. § 2339B (1994)).
291 Id.  at li. See also  David B. Kopel & Joseph Olson, Preventing a Reign of Ter-
ror:  Civil Liberties Implications of Terrorism Legislation , 21 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV.
247 (1996) (noting the dangers of the anti-terrorism bills which were subsequently
enacted as AEDPA); Michael J. Whidden, Note, Unequal Justice:  Arabs in America
and United States Antiterrorism Legislation , 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 2825 (2001) (not-
ing the discriminatory application of AEDPA).
292 DAVID COLE & JAMES X. DEMPSEY, TERRORISM AND THE CONSTITUTION:
SACRIFICING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE NAME OF NATIONAL SECURITY 119 (2d ed.
2002).
293 Banks & Bowman, supra  note 267, at 109.
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directly to an entirely lawful activity of the group.294  Noncitizens
can be deported on the basis of secret evidence for belonging to
organizations deemed “terrorist,” without any showing of per-
sonal involvement in terrorist or criminal activity; in other words,
for engaging in what would otherwise be associations protected
by the First Amendment.295  According to David Cole and James
Dempsey, AEDPA was:
[O]ne of the worst assaults on the Constitution in decades.  It
resurrected guilt by association as a principle of criminal and
immigration law.  It created a special court to use secret evi-
dence to deport foreigners labeled as “terrorists.”  It made
support for the peaceful humanitarian and political activities
of selected foreign groups a crime.  And it repealed a short-
lived law forbidding the FBI from investigating First Amend-
ment activities, opening the door once again to politically fo-
cused FBI investigations.296
Again, we see the national security being invoked to enact
laws and permit executive actions which target individuals and
organizations engaged in activities which may challenge the sta-
tus quo, but are otherwise lawful and constitutionally protected.
Although much of the congressional debate surrounding this bill
focused on the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and the 1995
bombing of the federal building in Oklahoma City,297 the mea-
sures requested by the Clinton administration were not a re-
sponse to new developments in terrorism, but changes that had
long been on the executive branch’s “wish list.”
For instance, the first Bush administration’s proposals to allow
secret evidence in deportation hearings had been twice rejected
by Congress.  The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS),
undeterred by lack of congressional approval and even by nu-
merous federal court decisions rejecting the practice, continued
to deport people on the basis of secret evidence.298
In 1984, the Reagan administration had tried unsuccessfully to
get Congress to criminalize “support” for terrorism and the first
Bush administration also made similar proposals.  Ten years
294 COLE & DEMPSEY, supra  note 292, at 121-23.
295 Banks & Bowman, supra  note 267, at 110.  At the same time, Congress passed
the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act (IIRIRA),
which made it easier to deport immigrants for their political associations and for
minor violations of criminal laws.  Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996).
296 COLE & DEMPSEY, supra  note 292, at 2-3.
297 Id.  at 108.
298 Id.  at 109.
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later, the Clinton administration succeeded by including a nar-
rower version of the ban in the Omnibus Crime Bill, but it was
accompanied by the Edwards amendment precluding investiga-
tions based solely on First Amendment-protected activities.299
Just as the Oklahoma City and 1993 World Trade Center
bombings served as the catalyst to obtain changes in the law that
the executive branch had long wanted, the September 11 attacks
on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon were seized upon
as the opportunity to pass even more restrictive legislation.  As
illustrated by the speed with which Attorney General John Ash-
croft introduced the enormous package of far-reaching changes
that constitute the USA PATRIOT Act, these were not carefully
considered responses to a new political development but the util-
ization of a prime opportunity to roll out the next phase of the
government’s wish list of repressive measures.  Some of the
“highlights” of the 2001 Act are considered in the following Part
VI.
VI
THE “USA PATRIOT” ACT OF 2001
[W]e have witnessed the Bush administration amass enormous
new powers in the months since September 11.  And we have
witnessed the administration, in an effort to maintain a free
hand in the exercise of its new powers, employ strategies that
are calculated to silence dissent.  First, it has questioned the
patriotism of those who oppose its policies, thereby fostering a
climate of intolerance of dissent.  Second, it has sought to dis-
courage political activism by imposing guilt by association.
Third, it has restricted access to government information,
which has stymied the press, the public, and even Congress in
their efforts to hold the executive accountable for its actions.
—Nancy Chang, Silencing Political Dissent300
A. The Flurry of Post-September 11 Activity
The Bush administration has been extraordinarily busy since
September 11.  President Bush immediately declared war on ter-
rorism,301 sent enough bombs and troops to Afghanistan to force
299 Id.  at 108-09.
300 CHANG, supra  note 25, at 92-93.
301 For alternative explanations of the attacks and subsequent U.S. actions see
generally Ward Churchill, Acts of Rebellion:  Notes on the Interaction of History and
Justice , in ACTS OF REBELLION: A WARD CHURCHILL READER xi-xx (2003);
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its government from power,302 and is currently threatening an in-
vasion of Iraq.303  The U.S. military has brought several hundred
captured “combatants” to Guantanamo Naval Base in Cuba,
where they have been held in outdoor cages and interrogated,
much to the consternation of international human rights
organizations.304
President Bush has issued a Military Order authorizing the cre-
ation of military tribunals to prosecute a very broad range of
noncitizens suspected of terrorism and sentence them to death.305
U.S. citizens thought to be involved in terrorist plots have been
removed from the criminal justice system and are being held by
military authorities.306  Attorney General John Ashcroft has re-
EQBAL AHMAD, TERRORISM: THEIRS AND OURS (2001); NOAM CHOMSKY, 9-11
(2001); GORE VIDAL, PERPETUAL WAR FOR PERPETUAL PEACE (2002); HOWARD
ZINN, TERRORISM AND WAR (2002).
302 See  Babak Behnam, Kabul Topples with Barely a Push:  Marching into the Af-
ghan Capital , MSNBC NEWS (Nov. 13, 2001), available at  http://www.msnbc.com/
news/656949.asp.  Although none of the hijackers were Afghanis, the U.S. govern-
ment says it attacked Afghanistan because its fundamentalist Taliban government
was “harboring” Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda training camps.
303 See  Mike Allen & Juliet Eilperin, Bush Aides:  No Iraq War Vote Needed ,
WASH. POST, Aug. 26, 2002, at A1; Kenneth T. Walsh et al., Another Step Closer to
War , U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 21, 2002, at 30.
304 See  Amnesty International, United States of America:  Memorandum to the
U.S. Government on the rights of people in U.S. custody in Afghanistan and Guan-
tanamo Bay, Apr. 15, 2002, AI-index: AMR 51/053/2002, available at  http://web.am
nesty.org/ai.nsf/recent/AMR510532002; Human Rights Watch, U.S.:  Growing Prob-
lem of Guantanamo Detainees, May 30, 2002, available at  www.hwr.org/press/2002/
05/guantanamo.htm; International Committee of the Red Cross, The ICRC in
Guantanamo Bay, Nov. 20, 2002, available at  http://www.icrc.org.
305 Military Order of Nov. 13, 2001, Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain
Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57831-36 (2002).  The Or-
der applies to any noncitizen the president “has reason to believe” is or was a mem-
ber of al Qaeda, someone involved in “acts of international terrorism,” broadly
defined, or someone who “knowingly harbored” someone in either of these catego-
ries.  In addition to identifying those to be tried by the military tribunals, the presi-
dent has the power to create the rules for the tribunals and change them at will,
appoint judges, prosecutors and defense lawyers, decide the sentence and all ap-
peals, and conduct the entire process in secret. See  Neal K. Katyal & Laurence H.
Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt:  Trying the Military Tribunals , 111 YALE L.J.
1259 (2002) (arguing that the Order establishing military tribunals is “flatly unconsti-
tutional”); see generally BARBARA OLSHANSKY, SECRET TRIALS AND EXECUTIONS;
MILITARY TRIBUNALS AND THE THREAT TO DEMOCRACY (2002); David Cole, En-
emy Aliens , 54 STAN. L. REV. 953 (2002).
306 Laurence H. Tribe, Editorial, Citizens, Combatants and the Constitution , N.Y.
TIMES, June 16, 2002, at D13 (“Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s assertion
that the United States is holding Mr. Padilla because it is ‘interested in finding out
what he knows’ is not legally persuasive”); see also Military Tribunal Won’t Try Pa-
dilla, Justice Dept. Says , WASH. POST, June 14, 2002, at A10 (reporting Justice De-
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cently stated that the government is considering plans to reinsti-
tute “detention centers” for U.S. citizens deemed threats to the
national security.307
Since September 11, 2001, the Department of Justice has ar-
rested approximately 2000 immigrants and held them indefinitely
without charge, often preventing them from contacting family,
friends or lawyers, and refusing to release information about who
or even how many people are being held.308  In the fall of 2001,
the Justice Department identified 5000 noncitizens based on their
age, gender, and country of origin, and  “invited” them to submit
to interviews with the INS and the FBI, subsequently acknowl-
edging its intent to expedite removal proceedings if the inter-
views revealed any immigration violations.309  A new National
Security Entry-Exit Registration System has been implemented
for nationals of certain countries, requiring them to be registered
and fingerprinted, and to periodically report where they are liv-
ing, what they are doing and when they leave the country.310
Ashcroft has also announced that the Department of Justice will
monitor conversations between attorneys and clients in
custody.311
The executive branch has simply assumed the authority to en-
partment claim that the United States can hold Padilla until the war against
terrorism is over); Jess Bravin, White House Seeks to Expand Indefinite Detentions in
Military Brigs, Even for U.S. Citizens , WALL. ST. J., Aug. 8, 2002, at A4.
307 See  Jonathan Turley, Camps for Citizens:  Ashcroft’s Hellish Vision; Attorney
General Shows Himself as a Menace to Liberty , L.A. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2002, at B11.
308 See CHANG, supra  note 25, at 67-87; Amnesty International, Amnesty Interna-
tional’s Concerns Regarding Post September 11 Detentions in the USA (Mar. 14,
2002), available at  http://web.amnesty.org/ai.nsf/Index/AMR510442002?OpenDocu
ment&of=COUNTRIES\USA; see generally  Natsu Taylor Saito, Will Force Trump
Legality After September 11?  American Jurisprudence Confronts the Rule of Law , 17
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1 (2002).
309 See OLSHANSKY, supra  note 305, at 8 (citing Statement of John Bell, Special
Agent in Charge of the Detroit FBI office, in  Associated Press, Federal Plans Con-
cern Arab Leaders , Nov. 16, 2001).
310 Press Release, Department of Justice, Attorney General Ashcroft Announced
Implementation of the First Phase of the National Security Entry-Exit Registration
System (Aug. 12, 2002), available at  http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2002/August/02_
ag_466.htm.
311 See  Special Administrative Measure for the Prevention of Acts of Violence
and Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 55062 (Oct. 31, 2001) (amending 28 C.F.R. s501.3(d));
CHANG, supra  note 25, at 90-91. See also  Avidan Y. Cover, Note, A Rule Unfit for
All Seasons:  Monitoring Attorney-Client Communications Violates Privilege and the
Sixth Amendment , 87 CORNELL L. REV. 1233 (2002) (analyzing criticisms of the gov-
ernment’s interception of attorney-client communications).
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gage in these actions.312  In addition, it has convinced Congress
to fund these activities and to expand the scope of its law en-
forcement and intelligence capabilities.  As a result, Congress has
appropriated billions of dollars for the above-mentioned actions
and passed dozens of bills in the wake of September 11.313  The
most significant, by far, is the so-called “USA PATRIOT” or
2001 Act.314  According to David Cole and James Dempsey:
The bill was never the subject of a Committee debate or mark-
up in the Senate . . . . [A]fter three weeks of behind-the-scenes
discussions between a few Senators and the Administration, a
bill was introduced in the Senate on October 5 that included
essentially all of the Administration’s proposals.  That bill
passed . . . on October 11, following a brief debate that made it
clear that even supporters of the legislation had not read it and
did not understand its provisions.  The next day, a slightly dif-
ferent bill was introduced in the House . . . and passed the
same day under a procedure barring the offering of any
amendments.  It is virtually certain that not a single member
of the House read the bill for which he or she voted.315
After the attorney general “exerted extraordinary pressure, es-
sentially threatening Congress that the blood of the victims of
future terrorist attacks would be on its hands if it did not swiftly
enact the Administration’s proposals,”316 the final version was in-
troduced on October 23, passed by the House on October 24 and
by the Senate on October 25, and signed into law by President
George W. Bush on October 26, 2001.317
The Act dramatically extends the government’s law enforce-
312 The executive seems to presume that such powers can be exercised on the
basis of its Constitutional responsibility for foreign affairs and military matters. U.S.
CONST. art. II. See Melissa K. Mathews, Restoring the Imperial Presidency:  An Ex-
amination of President Bush’s New Emergency Powers , 23 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. &
POL’Y 455 (2002) (criticizing President Bush’s actions as violating constitutionally
mandated separation of powers); Philip B. Heymann, Civil Liberties and Human
Rights in the Aftermath of September 11 , 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 441 (2002)
(focusing on powers available to law enforcement and intelligence agencies, rather
than the new statutory powers conferred by the 2001 Act).
313 See  THOMAS:  Legislative Information on the Internet, Legislation Related to
the Attack of September 11, 2001 , at  http://thomas.loc.gov/home/terrorleg.htm (on
file with author).
314 See supra  note 21. See generally  Jennifer C. Evans, Comment, Hijacking Civil
Liberties:  The USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 , 33 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 933 (2002); Michael
T. McCarthy, USA PATRIOT Act , 39 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 435 (2002).
315 COLE & DEMPSEY, supra  note 292, at 151.
316 Id.
317 The history of this bill can be found at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?
d107:HR03162:@@@L&summ2&.
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ment and intelligence gathering powers.  Although some of the
provisions of the act are subject to a four-year sunset provision,
acts begun or investigations initiated before the sunset date are
not affected, and these provisions can always be extended by
Congress.318  If one substitutes “counterintelligence” for its many
references to “counterterrorism,” and reads the Act in light of
the history of the FBI, it becomes clear that the 2001 Act is at-
tempting to legalize many of the repressive practices that the FBI
and other intelligence agencies have been engaging in for de-
cades.  This Part VI will highlight provisions of the 2001 Act that
are most disturbing in light of the history of the systematic abuse
of power and law engaged in by the very agencies now being
given more authority and more funding.
B. Enhanced Surveillance Powers
According to Nancy Chang of the Center for Constitutional
Rights, in passing the 2001 Act, “Congress granted the Bush ad-
ministration its longstanding wish list of enhanced surveillance
tools, coupled with the right to use these tools with only minimal
judicial and congressional oversight.”319  Title II, “Enhanced Sur-
veillance Procedures,” defines “foreign intelligence information”
very broadly to include not only information relating to attacks
or sabotage by foreign powers or their agents, but “information,
whether or not concerning a United States person [i.e., a U.S.
citizen or permanent resident], with respect to a foreign power or
foreign territory that relates to (i) the national defense or the
security of the United States; or (ii) the conduct of the foreign
affairs of the United States.”  Under this definition, it appears
that any U.S. citizen’s opinion on any matter of U.S. foreign pol-
icy, regardless of how abstract or even inane, is “foreign intelli-
gence information.”  Any foreign intelligence information
obtained in a criminal investigation, as well as any obtained by a
grand jury may be disclosed “to any Federal law enforcement,
intelligence, protective, immigration, national defense, or na-
318 CHANG, supra  note 25, at 47-48.
319 CHANG, supra  note 25, at 48. See also  Evans, supra  note 314 (noting the po-
tential for increased surveillance powers to undermine the Fourth Amendment);
Sharon H. Rackow, Comment, How the USA PATRIOT Act Will Permit Govern-
mental Infringement Upon the Privacy of Americans in the Name of “Intelligence”
Investigations , 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1651 (2002) (noting that the new powers given to
the executive are unnecessary, violate civil liberties, and go beyond the stated goal
of fighting terrorism).
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tional security official[s]” to assist in the performance of their
official duties.320
The Act extends the scope and duration of FISA-authorized
surveillance and physical searches, allowing for warrants that
cover multiple individuals and locations that extend beyond the
reach of the issuing court’s jurisdiction.321  It is now much easier
to obtain records from third parties such as telephone or utility
companies, banks and credit card companies,322 and even public
libraries.323  Although the Act makes it easier to get court orders
for access to such information, many companies report being
pressured to “turn over customer records voluntarily, in the ab-
sence of either a court order or a subpoena, ‘with the idea that it
is unpatriotic if the companies insist too much on legal subpoenas
first.’”324
Section 215 allows an FBI agent to apply for a court order re-
quiring the production of “any tangible things” simply by certify-
ing that they are wanted for an investigation “to protect against
international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities.”325
Evidence need not be presented, and the judge has no discretion;
if the application is sufficient on its face, he or she must issue the
order.326  This section removes the former FISA requirements
that the government specify that “there are specific and articul-
able facts” for believing that the material sought pertains to a
“foreign power or an agent of a foreign power,”327 and the gov-
ernment does not need even reasonable suspicion that the person
subject to the warrant be involved in any criminal activity.328
Section 216 provides that upon certification by a government
320 USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272, sec. 203(a)(1) (2001)
(amending Rule 6(e)(3)(C) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure).
321 Id.  sec. 207; see also CHANG, supra  note 25, at 49.  While other federal judges
are also authorized to issue such warrants, the Act expands the FISA Court from
seven to eleven judges. Id.  sec. 208.
322 See generally  USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001),
Title II (“Enhanced Surveillance Procedures”) and Title III (“International Money
Laundering Abatement and Anti-Terrorist Financing Act of 2001”).
323 See  Mark Sommer, Big Brother at the Library:  FBI’s Right to Data Raises
Privacy Issues , BUFF. NEWS, Nov. 11, 2002, at A1; see also CHANG, supra  note 25, at
50.
324 CHANG, supra  note 25, at 49-50 (quoting Ohio State University law professor
Peter Swire).
325 USA PATRIOT Act, sec. 215.
326 Id.
327 50 U.S.C. § 1862(b)(2)(B) (2000) (prior to amendment).
328 CHANG, supra  note 25, at 53.
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attorney that the information sought is “relevant” to any criminal
investigation, courts must order the installation of a pen register
and a trap-and-trace device which will allow the government to
obtain “dialing, routing, addressing and signaling” information
on telephone and internet lines.329  While interception of the
content of the communications is not authorized, there are no
safeguards to this effect.  In short, we must rely on the good faith
of the government in this regard. Chang notes that this section:
[A]uthorizes the government to install its new Carnivore, or
DCS1000, system, a formidable tracking device that is capable
of intercepting all forms of Internet activity, including e-mail
messages, Web page activity, and Internet telephone commu-
nications.  Once installed on an Internet service provider
(ISP), Carnivore devours all  of the communications flowing
through the ISP’s network—not just those of the target of the
surveillance but those of all users—tracking not just informa-
tion but content as well.330
FISA previously allowed orders for wiretaps and physical
searches to be issued without a showing of probable cause where
the government asserted that the gathering of “foreign intelli-
gence information” was “the purpose” of the investigation.331  In
addition to expanding the definition of “foreign intelligence in-
formation,”332 the 2001 Act now allows such warrants to be is-
sued in criminal investigations as long as the gathering of
“foreign intelligence information” is also a “significant” purpose
of the surveillance.333
Section 213, which is not limited to terrorism investigations but
extends to all criminal investigations, authorizes “sneak-and-
peak searches,” known in COINTELPRO days as “black bag
jobs,” i.e., searches conducted without notice of the warrant until
329 USA PATRIOT Act, sec. 216(b).
330 CHANG, supra  note 25, at 54-55.
331 50 U.S.C. §§ 1804(a)(7)(B), 1823(a)(7)(B) (2000) (prior to amendment).
332 See supra  text accompanying note 317.
333 USA PATRIOT Act, sec. 218.  As Chang notes, FISA was passed after the
Supreme Court held in United States v. United States Dist. Court for the Eastern Dist.
of Mich. , 407 U.S. 297 (1972), that the executive was not exempt from the Fourth
Amendment’s probable cause and warrant requirements in cases of domestic sur-
veillance (in this case, District Judge Damon J. Keith was among the respondents,
and the case is commonly referred to by his last name).  In light of Keith , the pre-
sumed constitutional validity of FISA rests on the fact that its relaxed warrant re-
quirements apply to foreign intelligence. CHANG, supra  note 25, at 57-58. See also
United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908 (4th Cir. 1980); United States v.
Johnson, 952 F.2d 565 (1st Cir. 1991) (both holding that FISA could not be used to
circumvent Fourth Amendment requirements in criminal cases).
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after the search has been completed.  This means, among other
things, that the target of the warrant cannot point out deficien-
cies in it or monitor whether the search is being conducted in
accordance with the warrant.334  After-the-fact notification may
be delayed “for a reasonable [and undefined] period” in searches
where notification “may have an adverse result,”335 and in the
case of seizures if “reasonably necessary.”  This could mean that
a person or organization subjected to a covert search or seizure
may never be informed about it, or may learn about it only when
evidence obtained is used against them in court.
C. The Blurring of Criminal and Intelligence Investigations
A major concern with the 2001 Act is not simply that the gov-
ernment can obtain more information on individuals and organi-
zations, but the expanded uses to which it can put this
information.  It has generally been presumed that the relaxed
standards for warrants available under FISA are constitutionally
acceptable because the purpose of the authorized surveillance
was foreign intelligence information, not information intended
for use in criminal prosecutions.336  Now, however, U.S. persons
can be targeted on the basis—although not solely  on the basis—
of First Amendment-protected activities and subjected to exten-
sive, and perhaps secret, surveillance and searches because they
are involved in activities that, under the broadened definition of
“foreign intelligence information,” relate to U.S. foreign policy
or national security.  Although the courts may yet find this to be
unconstitutional, the Act appears to allow the use of the informa-
tion thus obtained in criminal prosecutions.
The line between criminal and intelligence investigations is fur-
ther blurred by provisions that allow for the extensive sharing of
information.  Section 203 of the Act authorizes the FBI, CIA,
INS, and a number of other federal agencies to share information
that “involves” foreign intelligence or counterintelligence.  Tele-
334 CHANG, supra  note 25, at 51-52.  As Chang points out, such searches violate
the common law “knock and announce” requirement and Rule 41(d) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure which requires officers conducting searches to give
subjects a copy of the warrant and a receipt for property taken. Id.  at 51.
335 “Adverse result” is broadly defined to include “endangering the life or physi-
cal safety of an individual; flight from prosecution; destruction of or tampering with
evidence; intimidation of potential witnesses; or otherwise seriously jeopardizing an
investigation or unduly delaying a trial.”  18 U.S.C. § 2705(a)(2) (2003).
336 See  Banks & Bowman, supra  note 267, at 5-10, 90-92.
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phone or internet conversations that have been intercepted by
one agency can be disclosed to others, as can foreign intelligence
information obtained in the course of a criminal investigation.337
A dramatic extension of the law comes in Section 203(a) which
allows information obtained by federal grand juries to be shared
with these agencies, without judicial oversight and without any
requirement that the information relate to terrorist activities.338
Courts exercise no supervision over the issuance of grand jury
subpoenas.  Grand juries have an almost unlimited ability to sub-
poena witnesses and records, and are “generally ‘unrestrained by
the technical procedural and evidentiary rules governing the con-
duct of criminal trials.’”339 Witnesses can exercise their Fifth
Amendment right not to incriminate themselves through their
own testimony, but neither the Fourth nor the Fifth Amendment
prevents the compelled disclosure of records.340  Thus, witnesses
who have no right to a lawyer can be compelled—under threat of
going to jail for civil or criminal contempt—to produce any
records and to testify about highly personal matters or about the
criminal conduct of others.341
D. The Criminalization of Protest
The 2001 Act has also made some very significant substantive
changes in the criminal law.  As noted above, in the late 1940s
the Justice Department created a list of “subversive” organiza-
tions and considered not only membership but “sympathetic as-
sociation” with such organizations as evidence of disloyalty.342
The 1996 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act author-
ized the secretary of state to create a list of “foreign terrorist
organizations” and made it a felony to provide material aid to
such organizations.343  The 2001 Act expands on the 1996 Act by
authorizing the creation of a separate “terrorist exclusion list”
and by defining as “terrorist” a broad range of organizations not
337 USA PATRIOT Act, sec. 203(b)(i), (d)(1).
338 See  Sara Sun Beale & James E. Felman, The Consequences of Enlisting Federal
Grand Juries in the War on Terrorism:  Assessing the USA Patriot Act’s Changes to
Grand Jury Secrecy , 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 699 (2002) (analyzing the threat
posed by these changes to the integrity of the grand jury system).
339 CHANG, supra  note 25, at 60 (quoting In re Schofield , 486 F.2d 85, 90 (3rd Cir.
1973)).
340 COLE & DEMPSEY, supra  note 292, at 164.
341 See , e.g. , United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973).
342 See supra  text accompanying notes 121-25.
343 See supra  text accompanying note 291-93.
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on any official list.344  The penalty for providing material support
to designated organizations has been increased to fifteen years
imprisonment.345
The provision of the 2001 Act that may, in the long run, prove
most effective in suppressing political dissent is its creation of a
new crime of “domestic terrorism.”  As codified in Section 802,
this new and very broadly defined crime encompasses activities
which (1) “involve acts dangerous to human life that are [(2)] a
violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any
State;” and which (3) appear intended to (a) “intimidate or co-
erce a civilian population,” (b) “influence the policy of a govern-
ment by intimidation or coercion;” or (c) “affect the conduct of a
government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping;”
and which (4) “occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction
of the United States.”346
Many forms of social and political protest in the United States
can now be classified as “domestic terrorism.”  Any serious social
protest—such as demonstrations against the World Trade Organ-
ization, police brutality, or the war in Iraq—is, by definition, in-
tended to influence government policy and could easily be
interpreted as involving “coercion.”  Such protests could qualify
as acts of domestic terrorism if a law is broken (say, failure to
obey a police officer’s order) and life is endangered (perhaps by
blocking an intersection).
Many unjust laws—such as the South’s segregation laws–-have
historically been challenged by civil disobedience, and those who
engage in such actions have been prepared to pay the price of a
possible conviction under the law being challenged.  Many
protesters who fully intend to comply with the law know they run
the risk of being charged with “disorderly conduct” or other mis-
demeanors which carry relatively minor criminal penalties.  Now,
those who protest, and those who provide them with “material
support”347 (say, food or a place to stay), must at least be cogni-
zant that they could face felony charges and long prison terms.
As Nancy Chang notes:  “Because this crime is couched in such
vague and expansive terms, it is likely to be read by federal law
enforcement agencies as licensing the investigation and surveil-
344 USA PATRIOT Act, sec. 805; see also infra  text accompanying notes 355-59.
345 USA PATRIOT Act, sec. 810(d).
346 USA PATRIOT Act, sec. 802(a).
347 See  USA PATRIOT Act, sec. 805.
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lance of political activists and organizations that protest govern-
ment policies, and by prosecutors as licensing the criminalization
of legitimate political dissent.”348
E. Further Restrictions on Immigrants
As we have seen from the early application of the Alien Act349
to the provisions of the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Im-
migrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA),350 immigrants often bear
the brunt of laws and law enforcement policies designed to quash
political dissent.  The 2001 Act both broadens the definition of
who is deportable under the Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA) and gives the attorney general expanded powers to indefi-
nitely detain noncitizens.
Section 411 of the 2001 Act makes “terrorist activity” a deport-
able offense.  Although the government has generally defined
“terrorism” as “premeditated, politically motivated violence per-
petrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or
clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience,”351
under the INA as now amended it can include any crime involv-
ing a weapon or other dangerous device “other than for mere
personal monetary gain.”352  Thus, participation in a street fight
could make a permanent resident, quite possibly someone who
has lived in the United States since childhood, deportable as a
terrorist.  While this may seem far-fetched, there have been nu-
merous deportations and attempted deportations under the 1996
laws, IIRIRA and AEDPA, on the basis of comparably minor
incidents.353
348 CHANG, supra  note 25, at 44.  She goes on to note:
Experience has taught us that when prosecutors are entrusted with the dis-
cretion to file trumped-up charges for minor crimes, politically motivated
prosecutions and the exertion of undue pressure on activists who have been
arrested to turn state’s witness against their associates, or to serve as confi-
dential informants for the government, are not far behind.
Id.  at 113.
349 See supra  text accompanying notes 57-59, 92-93.
350 See supra  text accompanying notes 94, 298.
351 U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT, PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM 2001, May 2002,
available at  http://www.state.gov.s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2001/html/10220.htm.
352 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(lil)(V)(b) (2003).
353 See generally  Nancy Morawetz, Understanding the Impact of the 1996 Deporta-
tion Laws and the Limited Scope of Proposed Reforms , 113 HARV. L. REV. 1936
(2000); Dawn Marie Johnson, The AEDPA and the IIRIRA:  Treating Misdemeanors
as Felonies for Immigration Purposes , 27 J. LEGISL. 477 (2001) (illustrating some of
the hardships caused by the deportation laws).
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“Engaging in terrorist activity” now encompasses soliciting
members or funds, or providing material support to a “terrorist”
organization, even if the activity is undertaken solely to support
lawful, humanitarian activities of the organization, and even if
the associational activities would otherwise be protected by the
First Amendment.354  As David Cole and James Dempsey note:
Under the immigration law that existed before September 11,
aliens were deportable for engaging in or supporting terrorist
activity .  The PATRIOT Act makes aliens deportable for
wholly innocent associational activity with a “terrorist organi-
zation,” irrespective of any nexus between the alien’s associa-
tional conduct and any act of violence, much less terrorism.355
The noncitizen subject to deportation bears the nearly impossible
burden of showing “that he did not know, and should not reason-
ably have known, that the solicitation would further the organi-
zation’s terrorist activity.”356
“Terrorist organizations” now include not only those that have
been designated as “foreign terrorist organizations” by the State
Department pursuant to AEDPA,357 and groups on the secretary
of state’s new “terrorist exclusion list,”358 but also groups which
have never been officially identified as terrorist, but are com-
prised of “two or more individuals, whether organized or not”
who engage in certain activities, including the use or threat of
violence.359  This definition “potentially encompasses every or-
ganization that has ever been involved in a civil war or a crime of
violence, from a pro-life group that once threatened workers at
an abortion clinic, to the African National Congress, the Irish
Republican Army, or the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan.”360
Upon the attorney general’s certification that he or she has
“reasonable grounds to believe” that an immigrant is engaged in
354 USA PATRIOT Act, sec. 411(a).
355 COLE & DEMPSEY, supra  note 292, at 153.
356 USA PATRIOT Act, sec. 411(a).
357 See supra  text accompanying notes 290-92.  The criteria for such designation
are found at 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(1)(A)-(C) (2003), and the list is published periodi-
cally in the Federal Register . See , e.g. , Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organiza-
tions, 67 Fed. Reg. 14761 (Mar. 27, 2002).
358 See  Designation of 39 “Terrorist Organizations” Under the “USA PATRIOT
Act,” 66 Fed. Reg. 63620 (Dec. 7, 2001).  The criteria for this list are much broader
than for the list created under AEDPA.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(3)(B)(iv)(I)-(III)
(2003).
359 USA PATRIOT Act, sec. 411(a).  The activities are listed at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(vi)(III) (2003).
360 COLE & DEMPSEY, supra  note 292, at 153.
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terrorist activities, as broadly defined above, or in other activities
threatening to the national security, Section 412 provides that the
INS can detain that person for up to seven days without
charge.361  If someone so certified is charged with any immigra-
tion violation, no matter how minor, Section 412 mandates that
he or she be held indefinitely, without the possibility of release
on bond, until deportation.362  Although the attorney general is
to review the certification every six months, there is no require-
ment that the immigrant be shown the evidence on which it is
based, or be given a hearing to contest the evidence.  The immi-
grant’s only remedy is to seek a writ of habeas corpus in federal
district court.363
Even when such a person is eligible for political asylum or
other relief from removal—i.e., has a statutory right to remain in
the country—Section 412 makes no provision for release.  As
Cole and Dempsey point out, the INS already had the authority
to detain someone in deportation proceedings who presented a
risk of flight or a threat to national security.  “Thus, what the new
legislation adds is the authority to detain aliens who do not  pose
a current danger or flight risk, and who are not  removable be-
cause they are entitled to asylum or some other form of
relief.”364
F. Enhanced Funding and Inter-Agency Communication
Title I, “Enhancing Domestic Security Against Terrorism,”
creates a separate “counterterrorism fund” which, among other
things, will “reimburse any Department of Justice component for
any costs incurred in connection with . . . providing support to
counter, investigate, or prosecute domestic or international ter-
rorism.”365  The Technical Support Center established by the
1996 AEDPA “to help meet the demands for activities to combat
terrorism and support and enhance the technical support and tac-
361 USA PATRIOT Act, sec. 412.  Of course, the seven day limit seems rather
meaningless at this point since the Justice Department has been indefinitely detain-
ing hundreds of immigrants without charge for many months. See supra  text accom-
panying note 308.
362 USA PATRIOT Act, sec. 412.
363 USA PATRIOT Act, sec. 412(a).
364 COLE & DEMPSEY, supra  note 292, at 156; see also  Regina Germain, Rushing
to Judgment:  The Unintended Consequences of the USA PATRIOT Act for Bona
Fide Refugees , 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 505 (2002) (noting the likely effect of the 2001
Act on political asylum adjudications).
365 USA PATRIOT Act, sec. 101(a)(1).
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tical operations of the FBI” is given an additional $200 million
for each of the next three years,366 and the director of the Secret
Service is instructed to develop a national network of electronic
crime task forces to prevent, detect, and investigate various
forms of electronic crimes.367
In addition, Section 701 provides an additional $50 million in
2002 and $100 million in 2003 for expanding the Regional Infor-
mation Sharing System (RISS)that was created by the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968,368 an intranet sys-
tem which can be accessed by 5600 federal, state, and local law
enforcement agencies.369  Nancy Chang spells out some of the
potential problems:
By allowing information about individuals suspected of the
new crime of domestic terrorism to be shared with thousands
of law enforcement agencies, RISS places at risk of harm polit-
ical activists who engage in, associate with those who engage
in, or are suspected of engaging in civil disobedience.  Infor-
mation concerning activists that is personally sensitive or sim-
ply irrelevant to any legitimate law enforcement purpose, as
well as erroneous or outdated information, can easily find its
way into an RISS database.  Once posted, this information can
quickly be circulated to thousands of law enforcement offices,
some of which may share the information with governmental
and private organizations.  The potential for arrest based on
false charges, invasion of one’s privacy, damage to reputation,
loss of employment, or other injuries resulting from the misuse
of posted information is extremely high.370
G. Are We More Secure?
According to the Bush administration, all of the measures de-
scribed in this Part VI have been taken “for our security.”  How-
ever, as of August 2002, the government had brought only one
criminal indictment on charges related to terrorism, and that was
against Zacarious Moussaoui, who is alleged to have been the
“twentieth hijacker” and was already in custody on September
11.371  According to the Justice Department’s six-month report to
366 USA PATRIOT Act, sec. 103.
367 USA PATRIOT Act, sec. 105.
368 42 U.S.C. § 3796h (2003).
369 CHANG, supra  note 25, at 112. See also  Jim McGee, Fighting Terror with
Databases:  Domestic Intelligence Plans Stir Concern , WASH. POST, Feb. 16, 2002, at
A27.
370 CHANG, supra  note 25, at 114-15.
371 Cole, supra  note 305, at 960.
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Congress on the implementation of Section 412 of the 2001 Act
which mandates the detention of alien terrorists, not a single
noncitizen had been certified as a terrorist.372  Thousands of peo-
ple have been secretly detained without charge, and thousands
more deported on technical immigration violations.  This has had
a devastating effect on Arab American and South Asian commu-
nities in the United States, but has not had any demonstrable
effect on reducing criminal activity in the country.373
What is demonstrable is that the scenario described above by
Nancy Chang is taking place.374  The government’s ability to
gather information on the constitutionally protected activities of
law-abiding Americans has surged dramatically.  The very mini-
mal restraints put on the FBI and other law enforcement and
intelligence agencies in the wake of the exposure of COINTEL-
PRO-type activities have disappeared altogether.375  In addition
to the changes wrought by the 2001 Act itself, the lack of mini-
mal restraints can be seen in Attorney General Ashcroft’s recent
revisions of the Smith guidelines for domestic intelligence gather-
ing described in Part V.376
The new Ashcroft guidelines, issued on May 30, 2002, author-
ize a full investigation when facts or circumstances “reasonably
indicate that a federal crime has been, is being, or will be com-
mitted.”377  “Terrorism enterprise investigations” are authorized
372 CHANG, supra  note 25, at 71-72.
373 While this is portrayed as making significant inroads against “illegal immigra-
tion,” in fact it is estimated that there are about 300,000 people currently in the
country who are similarly in violation of the terms of their visas.  Cole, supra  note
305, at 975.  Thus, this is more accurately described as a program selectively target-
ing a very small sector of that group based on national origin, race or ethnicity, age
and gender, not as a move against illegal immigration in general.
374 See  Ann Davis, Far Afield:  FBI’s Post-Sept. 11 “Watch List” Mutates, Acquires
Life of Its Own , WALL ST. J., Nov. 19, 2002, at A1 (noting the widespread dissemi-
nation and misuse of a list circulated by the FBI to corporations of persons it wished
to question).
375 According to Nat Hentoff:
A new addition to John Ashcroft’s war on both terrorism and our Constitu-
tion is his plan—under the expanded surveillance powers in the USA Pa-
triot Act—to reintroduce a current version of COINTELPRO. . . . On a
Dec. 2 episode of ABC’s “This Week,” Attorney General John Ashcroft
not only did not deny the advent of a new COINTELPRO, but stoutly
maintained that he will pursue whatever has to be done in the war against
terrorism.  He doesn’t need congressional approval for this assault on the
First and Fourth Amendments.
Opinion-Editorial: Sweet Land of Liberty , WASH. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2001, at A21.
376 See supra  text accompanying notes 274-79.
377 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, THE ATTORNEY GEN-
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when the FBI has a reasonable indication that “two or more per-
sons are engaged in an enterprise for the purpose of . . . further-
ing political or social goals wholly or in part through activities
that involve force or violence and a violation of federal criminal
law” or for the purpose of engaging in terrorism, including the
newly created crime of “domestic terrorism.”378  Full investiga-
tions may also be initiated where facts or circumstances reasona-
bly indicate that a group has engaged in or intends to engage in
acts involving force or violence or covered criminal conduct, in-
cluding “domestic terrorism,” in a political demonstration.379
Once an investigation begins, the guidelines specifically author-
ize agents to collect information on the group’s membership,
funding, geographic reach, and “past and future activities and
goals. . . .”380
Where there is no reasonable indication of criminal activity, a
preliminary investigation may now be undertaken if there is in-
formation or an allegation which indicates the “possibility of
criminal activity” and an FBI supervisor believes it warrants fur-
ther scrutiny.381  All of the techniques of a full investigation, in-
cluding confidential informants, undercover operations, and
searches and seizures,382 may be utilized except for the opening
of mail and nonconsensual electronic surveillance.383
Even when there is no basis for any kind of investigation, the
Ashcroft guidelines instruct Bureau agents to “proactively draw
on available sources of information to identify terrorist threats
and activities,” including nonprofit and commercial data search
services, information volunteered by private entities, regardless
of whether it was legally obtained, and the surveillance of pub-
licly accessible places and events.384  As Nancy Chang notes,
these guidelines are
ERAL’S GUIDELINES ON GENERAL CRIMES, RACKETEERING ENTERPRISE AND TER-
RORISM ENTERPRISE INVESTIGATIONS (2002), available at  http://www.usdoj.gov/olp/
generalcrimes2.pdf [hereinafter ATTORNEY GENERAL’S GUIDELINES]. See also
CHANG, supra note 25, at 115-19.
378 ATTORNEY GENERAL’S GUIDELINES, supra  note 377, at 15.  These investiga-
tions can be authorized for up to a year by the special agent in charge of a field
office. Id.  at 17. See supra  text accompanying notes 346-48.
379 ATTORNEY GENERAL’S GUIDELINES, supra  note 377, at 16.
380 Id.  at 17.
381 Id.  at 1.
382 Id.  at 18-20.
383 Id.  at 9.
384 Id.  at 21-22.
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likely to lead to intrusive intelligence gathering on those who
engage in non-violent civil disobedience or in lawful but con-
frontational political activities, as well as those who attract the
attention of the FBI as it trolls through private databases, at-
tends churches and mosques, and surfs the Web.  With the ad-
vent of electronic record-keeping, the FBI is likely to maintain
far more dossiers on law-abiding individuals and to dissemi-
nate the dossiers far more widely than during the COINTEL-
PRO era.385
Does placing this information in the hands of law enforcement
make us more secure?  Four medical students traveling to Florida
to begin their internships were turned in by a woman who
thought she overheard a “suspicious” conversation.  The inter-
state highway was shut down, the students stopped, searched and
held in custody for several days and their car torn apart.  No evi-
dence of criminal or terrorist activity was found and the only tan-
gible result appears to be that the students may have lost their
internships and, quite possibly, their careers as doctors.  None-
theless, law enforcement officials’ response was that “no harm
was done” and the woman’s actions were roundly praised by the
media.386
Although only a small portion of the “spy files” kept by the
Denver Police Department have been released, they contain no
evidence of any criminal activity engaged in by those identified
as “criminal extremists,” or prevented as a result of the compila-
tion of vast amounts of personal data.  On the contrary, some of
the files state that the Denver police had been notified by the
FBI of a very specific plan to assassinate two leaders of the Colo-
rado chapter of the American Indian Movement, but apparently
nothing was done to prevent the attack.387  Those planning the
attack were not arrested or prosecuted, and the targets were not
385 CHANG, supra  note 25, at 119.
386 Associated Press, Florida Terror Suspects Paid Toll  (Sept. 20, 2002), available
at  2002 WL 100407327 (noting that videotape showed the medical students who
were allegedly detained for failure to pay a toll had paid it); 3 Medical Students Get
New Posts for Training; E-Mail Threats Behind Change , S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL (Fort
Lauderdale), Sept. 18, 2002, at 3B, available at  2002 WL 100400628 (noting that
Gov. Jeb Bush called the woman to thank her for the tip); Big Mouths Result in Big
Trouble/3 Held, Released in Threat Probe , HOUSTON CHRON., Sept. 14, 2002, at 1,
available at  2002 WL 23223309 (noting that of the three students stopped, one was a
U.S.-born citizen and another a naturalized U.S. citizen); Florida Hospital May Still
Host 3 Held in False Alarm , L.A. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2002, at A12, available at  2002
WL 2505671 (noting that the hospital the students were to train at turned them away
after the incident).
387 Files about American Indian Movement and Ward Churchill produced by
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even notified so that they could take appropriate security
precautions.388
Given the lack of tangible evidence of criminal activity pro-
duced by the post-September 11 governmental measures, the
long and well-documented history of the use of comparable mea-
sures to suppress movements for social change, and the chilling
effect on First Amendment activities already evident as a result
of recently heightened surveillance programs, it seems reasona-
ble to conclude that people who live in America are not more
secure but, in fact, more vulnerable to violations of their consti-
tutionally protected rights.  If anything is more secure as a result
of these measures it is the status quo.  Those who currently exer-
cise political, economic, and military power will be more firmly
entrenched and the nation’s resources will continue to be used to
further their interests.
VII
USING “LAW” TO SUBVERT THE RULE OF LAW
As long as we continue to go to work or pay our taxes or oth-
erwise conduct business as usual, we contribute to the contin-
ued functioning of the various social systems to which we
belong. . . . Perhaps, however, our sense of that complicity will
awaken us from the everydayness in which we routinely slum-
ber away our lives.  Perhaps it will stir us to recognize that
something extraordinary is afoot, demanding that we behave
in ways beyond the ordinary.
—Douglas V. Porpora, How Holocausts Happen389
Since September 11, 2001 the administration has consistently
told the American public that the government needs expanded
powers in order to ensure our security, and Congress has will-
ingly complied by passing legislation that dramatically restricts
rights guaranteed to the people under the Constitution.  Al-
Denver Police Department (on file with author). See supra  text accompanying notes
25-29.
388 Id.  Those identified as planning the attack have been linked to federal activ-
ity, see  Faith Attaguile, “Why Do You Think We Call It Struggle?”  An Essay on the
Subversion of the American Indian Movement  (on file with author), bringing to mind
the inter-organizational conflict promoted by the FBI in its COINTELPRO opera-
tions with the hope of causing activists to kill each other. See , e.g. , supra  text ac-
companying notes 149-52 (describing confrontations between the United Slaves
(US) organization and the Black Panther Party).
389 PORPORA, supra  note 19, at 185-86.
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though many of the executive’s actions, such as the “disappear-
ing” and indefinite detention of over 1200 immigrants and the
Executive Order authorizing military tribunals, as well as the
new legislation, have been criticized by advocates of civil rights
and civil liberties, the debate has remained within the framework
presented by the government, i.e., how much “liberty” are we
willing to sacrifice for the sake of “security”?
In this Essay I have presented a cursory sketch of the history
of the United States government’s use of its law enforcement
powers in the hope that it will prompt us to look more critically
at our assumptions about the government’s use of power to make
us more secure.  In addition to whatever else the federal govern-
ment may or may not have been doing, it has consistently used its
powers, legally and illegally, to suppress social and political
movements which it deems threatening to the status quo.  It is in
this context that we must examine the expanded powers cur-
rently being exercised by the executive branch and legitimized by
Congress.
Chief Justice Rehnquist, in his recent book, All the Laws but
One:  Civil Liberties in Wartime , examines President Abraham
Lincoln’s suspension of the writ of habeas corpus during the Civil
War and briefly discusses the internment of Japanese Americans
during World War II.390  He concludes that it is not likely or de-
sirable for civil liberties to be “as favored” in wartime, as the
laws will necessarily “speak with a somewhat different voice.”391
In essence, his message seems to be that while the government
occasionally makes mistakes during times of national emergency,
we need not worry about losing our civil liberties because, when
the emergency is over, things will return to “normal.”
This is a message often repeated in discussions about curtailing
civil liberties today.  Chief Justice Rehnquist may well be right
that things will return to normal.  However, the question remains
whether the norm is acceptable.  As I have tried to point out, the
current expansion of executive powers and the concomitant re-
strictions on civil rights are not simply a response to a national
emergency sparked by recent acts of terrorism, but a move to-
ward legitimating powers that have a long history of being used
consciously and deliberately to suppress political dissent.
In the name of “national security,” governmental agencies
390 See generally REHNQUIST, supra  note 36.
391 Id.  at 224-25.
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have a consistent history of knowingly violating fundamental
rights guaranteed by the Constitution.  As on-going revelations
about the Denver “spy files” illustrate, these are not practices
that can be safely relegated to the past.  Nor are they limited to a
“chilling effect” on freedom of expression.  The federal govern-
ment has subjected the American people, those it is charged with
protecting, to false and deliberately misleading propaganda,
wrongful arrests and arbitrary detentions, physical assaults and
assassinations, and the crushing of law-abiding organizations.
What has been “disrupted and destroyed” in the process are not
only the targeted individuals, organizations and movements, but
the core values the government claims to be protecting:  free-
dom, democracy and the rule of law.
As I indicated in the Preface, there is much about the status
quo that desperately needs to be changed.  There is nothing ac-
ceptable about the fact that the planet’s ecology is in rapid disin-
tegration392 or that the conditions of life are so bleak that in
some indigenous communities seventy percent of all children de-
liberately obliterate their consciousness by inhaling gasoline
fumes.393  Every day the news brings us evidence of widespread
violations of human rights, both at home and around the world.
The United States, as the world’s only political, economic, and
military superpower, bears much of the responsibility for these
conditions, and the American people have the right—and obliga-
tion—to influence governmental policies and make the structural
changes necessary to realize fundamental human rights.
Bringing about such changes requires the ability to express po-
litical opinions, criticize policies, and organize movements for so-
cial change.  For that very reason, these are rights built into the
Constitution and firmly established in international law.  To the
extent that governmental practices violate the Constitution and
basic principles of international law, the fact that they are being
“legalized” by Congress cannot give us comfort.  Again, this was
one of the basic principles articulated by Supreme Court Justice
Robert Jackson at the Nuremberg Tribunals, that the existence of
national laws legitimizing particular practices does not render
those practices lawful in the larger sense of the term.394  The abil-
392 See supra  Preface.
393 See GEOFFREY YORK, THE DISPOSSESSED: LIFE AND DEATH IN NATIVE CA-
NADA 10 (Little, Brown & Co. Ltd. 1992) (1989).
394 See supra  Preface.  As international legal scholar Richard Falk says:
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ity to influence the policies and practices of the government that
is acting in our name is the essence of democracy.  It is our re-
sponsibility, particularly the responsibility of lawyers and legal
scholars, to ensure that this is, in fact, a democracy.
In post-Nuremberg settings, a government that flagrantly violates interna-
tional law is engaged in criminal behavior even on a domestic plane, and as
far as internal law is concerned, its policies are not entitled to respect.  To
disobey is no longer . . . to engage in “civil disobedience.” . . . To resist
reasonably a violation of international law is a matter of legal right, possi-
bly even of legal duty if knowledge and a capacity for action exists.
Richard Falk, Introduction  to FRANCIS ANTHONY BOYLE, DEFENDING CIVIL RESIS-
TANCE UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW xxi (1988).
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